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Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace
Misappropriated Property in Equity
and in UCC § 9-306
Dale A. Oesterlet
INTRODUCTION
The restitutionary right to trace misappropriated property into its
product is a powerful and pervasive remedial right.' Tracing relief can
augment normal measures of recovery significantly whenever a claimant
can identify specific property held by a defendant as derivative of prop-
erty against which the claimant had or has an in specie claim. The in
specie claim can originate in rights born in the various substantive fields
of private law-tort, contract, fraud, restitution, commercial law, and
creditor's rights. The primary aims of this article are to identify defi-
ciencies in the case law defining the right to trace and to offer sugges-
tions for correcting these deficiencies. Because tracing has wide
application as a remedial theory, the analysis in this article has implica-
tions for many areas of the law. The article develops these implicatons
in tracing's traditional settings. Where tracing has been incorporated
into sophisticated statutory schemes, such as Article Nine of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, however, the article exposes the deficiencies
and, with tentative suggestions, invites veterans of these statutory do-
mains to address the problems.
I
TRACING DEFINED
An analysis of tracing must begin with a definition of the right.
Despite the straightforward appearance of its name, restitutionary
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1971, M.P.P. 1974, J.D. 1975,
Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professors John J. Barcelo
III, Theodore Eisenberg, Alan Gunn, Russell K. Osgood, and Robert S. Summers on early
drafts of this article. The author also thanks two able Cornell Law School students, Alan M.
Anderson '82 and Steven R. Wall '83, for their help in the preparation of this article.
1 The primary American reference works on tracing are RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION §§ 202-215 (1936); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 421-30 (1973); 1
G. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION §§ 2.14-2.19 (1978); 5 A. Scor, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS §§ 507-522 (3d ed. 1967). Important early articles on the topic are Ames, Following
Misappropriated roperty Into Its Aoduct, 19 HARV. L. REv. 511 (1906); Williston, The Right to
Follow Trust Poperty When Confused With Other Proper, 2 HARv. L. REV. 28 (1888). English
law on tracing is ably discussed in R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF REsTrruTioN 46-63
(2d ed. 1978).
"tracing" is not a simple concept, and Anglo-American lawyers have
used it to describe a variety of claims. For the purposes of this article, I
define tracing as a restitutionary right to claim specific property, not
otherwise subject to a possessary or ownership interest of the claimant,
that arises from a property interest of the claimant in other property
that another has misappropriated. Thus, the claim has two basic ele-
ments. First, it is asserted against specific property in which the claim-
ant himself has no property interest other than that which the right
provides. Second, the property claimed is identifiably linked in select
ways to a misappropriated property interest. The following hypotheti-
cal illustrates the concept in its most elemental form:
Owner has legal title to a motor vehicle. Defendant misappropriates
the vehicle and exchanges it for stock from a third party. Owner can
"trace" into the stock and demand it in specie.
Observe that in satisfaction of the first element the Owner's claim is
respected even though he had no pre-existing property interest in the
stock; the stock is a substitute for the misappropriated motor vehicle.
Note also that an owner who claims superior title to the vehicle over the
third party as the result of a pre-existing interest does not, according to
my definition, assert a tracing claim. Some would disagree, however,
and say that the owner "traces" his property through the exchange into
the hands of the third party, especially when the third party is a bank-
ruptcy trustee or the like.2
The second element, the requirement of an identifiable link be-
tween the substitute property against which the tracing claim is made
and the misappropriated property, is satisfied by one or more of three
events. The defendant can acquire the substitute property: (1) in a di-
rect exchange for the misappropriated property;3 (2) as income (rent,
interest, royalties, crops, or profit) produced by the misappropriated
property;4 or (3) as part of an identifiable fund of money in which mis-
2 See, e.g., Surgi v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 125 F.2d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1942); Otis
v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245, 246, 45 N.E. 737, 737 (1897). Consistent with my definition, tracing
claims can be said to apply against third parties, if at all, only when the third party has
received income from, exchanged something for, or commingled the misappropriated asset.
See infta notes 23, 39.
3 See, e.g., Haskel Eng'g & Supply Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 78 Cal. App.
3d 371, 144 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1978); Middlebrooks v. Lonas, 246 Ga. 720, 272 S.E.2d 687
(1980); Lane County Escrow Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 277 Or. 273, 560 P.2d 608 (1977). A version
of the direct-exchange link occurs when the wrongdoer uses the property of the victim to
discharge an obligation of the wrongdoer to a third person or to discharge a lien held by a
third person upon the wrongdoer's property. Such an exchange entitles the victim to be
subrogated to the third person's rights that were discharged by the payment. RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 207 (1936).
4 See, e.g., Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); Peine v. Murphy, 26 Hawaii 233, 377 P.2d 708 (1962); McGaffee v. McGaffee,
244 Iowa 879, 58 N.W.2d 357 (1953). In this setting, tracing merges into equitable account-
ing. Indeed, some commentators consider parts of equitable accounting to be an embodiment
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appropriated money and other indistinguishable monies have been com-
mingled.5 For simplicity sake I term them (1) "exchange tracing," (2)
"income tracing," and (3) "commingled fund tracing." The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving any transactional link between the misap-
propriated property and the property found in the defendant's hands.6
of the tracing doctrine. E.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 253 ("The principle of tracing used in
constructive trust cases is the same principle applied here, so that it is possible to think of the
accounting for profits in [cases against nonfiduciaries] as simply a special form of constructive
trust."). Equitable accounting provides a remedy very similar to the tracing remedy in cases
of fiduciary breach, unfair competition, trademark infringement, or copyright infringement.
See, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) (accounting
granted for profits received from use of plaintiff's trademark on defendant's shoes); RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 136 comment a (1936). The difficulty of crediting the defendant
for expenses incurred in acquiring the profit and of apportioning the profit between the de-
fendant's wrongful acts and his legitimate contributions poses questions that also arise in the
context of tracing. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. One commentator notes that
"[i]t is enough to make anyone wonder whether the whole thing is worth it." D. DOBBS,supra
note 1, at 277. The basic difference between a decree of accounting, and a decree for a
constructive trust or equitable lien as a result of tracing, is that an accounting may result in a
general money judgment, but a constructive trust or equitable lien must rest on the plaintiff's
equitable ownership rights in specific property. Thus, if an accounting is proper, the defend-
ant is liable for even those profits that he has dissipated; the plaintiff obtains a money judg-
ment that the defendant must satisfy from his other assets. For a constructive trust decree to
be proper, however, the plaintiff must identify in the defendant's hands the profits received as
a result of the wrong. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 198, 215 (1936).
5 If the plaintiff's property is mixed with other indistinguishable property, as is usually
the case when money is converted, Anglo-American courts allow the plaintiff to claim a spe-
cific proportion of the mixed pool of assets. The Restatement, for example, applies commin-
gling rules to money and cases in which "the wrongdoer acquires property with money of
another and money of his own, even though the money is not physically mingled." RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 210 comment a, § 214 (1936); see a/ro Montgomery v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 220 Or. 553, 349 P.2d 464 (1960) (commingling turkeys). The victim is said to
"own" part of the commingled mass, even though he cannot identify specific property that
originally was in his possession. See, e.g., Rackely v. Mathews, 141 Fla. 307, 309, 193 So. 69,
70 (1940); First Trust Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 870-72, 254 N.W. 569, 576 (1934).
But cf. Thomas v. Wasson, 191 Ark. 869, 875-76, 88 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1935) (county treasurer
who deposited public funds in bank such that bank became trustee is not entitled to prefer-
ence over bank commission when bank failed). The victim's claim is superior to the claims of
other creditors of the fund. It is unjust, many argue, for creditors to collect from an insolvent
estate that the victim's misappropriated property or funds have specifically augmented. A
creditor of the wrongdoer assumes the risk of his insolvency, but the victim, an involuntary
creditor, does not. See In re Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 640
(1935) ("[T]he fiduciary's creditors have accepted the risk of his solvency, while his cestuis
have accepted only the risk of his honesty."); see a/so 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, at 185.
Although early English courts were willing to grant relief in replevin for the "confusion"
of fungible goods, see C. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 6.8-.14 (3d ed. 1975),
these courts held that any right to follow money mingled with money of another was lost
because "money has no earmark." See, e.g., Whitecomb v. Jacob, I Salk. 160, 91 Eng. Rep.
149 (Ch. 1710). Thus money could be traced only if kept separate and invested in other
property. See, e.g., Exparte Dale & Co., 11 Ch. D. 772, 775-76 (1879). In 1879, Jessel, M.R.,
believed the law inadequate and created the commingling branch of tracing in equity. See
Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696, 714 (1879). Some writers would extend the equitable
doctrine to cases involving fungible goods, eclipsing the replevin remedy for confusion. See
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 214 (1936).
6 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215 comment b (1936). In commingled-fund
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A causal but nontransactional link between a misappropriation and the
ability of the wrongdoer to hold or acquire other property is not suffi-
cient to support tracing into the other property. For example, imagine a
thief who must spend $100 on food to sustain himself, and who has $100
in gold coins. Instead of spending the coins on food, he steals bearer
bonds worth $100 and exchanges them for food that he consumes. In
this situation the victim cannot trace into the gold coins, even though
the thief has retained the coins only because he stole the bonds.7
Tracing is a restitutionary right in two senses. First, although the
claimant does not obtain restitution of his original property, he does
receive a specific substitute therefor. Tracing thus appears to comport
with an inexact but popular man-in-the-street understanding of the
term "restitution." Second, and more significantly, theorists argue that
tracing is restitutionary in that the doctrine is premised on the principle
of unjust enrichment--the conceptual thread that is said to unite all
cases, however, once the plaintiff proves that the defendant possesses the fund, some jurisdic-
tions shift the burden of proof on apportionment to the defendant. Eg., Hurst v. Hurst, 1
Ariz. App. 603, 405 P.2d 913 (1965); Winger v. Chicago City Bank &Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 67
N.E.2d 265 (1946). But see Simonson v. McInvaille, 42 Wis. 2d 346, 166 N.W.2d 155 (1969)
(burden of identification of portion of fund is on plaintiff).
7 The RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 215 comment a (1936) contains the following
example:
[Tracing is inapplicable] although it is proved that if the wrongdoer had not
dissipated the property of the claimant he would have dissipated other prop-
erty which he still holds. Thus, if a person wrongfully takes money belonging
to another person and uses the money in paying an unsecured debt of the
wrongdoer and the creditor has no notice of the wrong, the other person is not
entitled to priority over the general creditors of the wrongdoer, even though it
is proved that if the wrongdoer had not succeeded in getting the money of the
other person he would have sold certain securities of his own and used the
proceeds in paying the debt. In such a case the wrongdoer does not hold the
securities or any of his other property upon a constructive trust for or subject
to an equitable lien in favor of the person whose money he wrongfully used.
8 The principle of unjust enrichment has two primary elements. First, the defendant
must receive a benefit. Second, the defendant's retention of the benefit must be unfair or
unjust. Some writers break the second element down into two separate considerations: (a)
the defendant's enrichment is at the plaintiff's expense; and (b) to allow the defendant to
retain the benefit would be unjust. See, e.g., R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 1, at 11-25.
Professor Dawson argues that because restitution does not usually depend on a showing that
someone's aggregate wealth has increased, the word "enriched" should be abandoned in favor
of a more "neutral" phrase, such as "the retrieval of unjustified acquisition." Dawson, Restitu-
tion Without Enrichment, 61 B.U.L. REV. 563, 577 (1981).
The second element-unjustness---may be satisfied by the defendant's violation of duties
defined by the law of torts, contracts, or fiduciary duties. In these cases, restitution provides
alternative remedies. The elements also may be satisfied by the presence of circumstances
prescribed solely through the evolution of the restitutionary doctrine itself. In these cases,
restitution provides the only remedy. The latter category is illustrated by the restitutionary
rule that forces the defendant to disgorge money received from the plaintiff as a result of the
plaintiff's mistaken belief that the defendant is a creditor; no tort or contract doctrine will
otherwise provide relief. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 126 comment b, illustration 1
(1936). The basis for calling the substantive rules in this latter category restitutionary is the
theory of relief that accompanies the substantive right; courts award a judgment based on an
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restitutionary doctrines.9 Tracing, many believe, is a part of restitution
because it divests the wrongdoer of gains inappropriately obtained at
the plaintiff's expense. For example, if a thief steals an asset with a mar-
ket value of ten dollars, and is able to trade it for an asset worth twenty
dollars, courts will not limit the victim to a remedy of ten dollars in
damages. By allowing the victim to claim specifically the twenty-dollar
asset, the courts force the thief to disgorge all of the benefits that he
unjustly obtained from the theft. If the victim were limited to an ordi-
nary damages remedy, the thief would "profit from his wrong," for he
would retain a ten-dollar profit after paying the damages. In addition,
the argument continues, allowing thieves to retain such profits would
encourage future thefts. In sum, courts find it more desirable to give the
victim a windfall of ten dollars than to allow the wrongdoer to keep any
profit.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the basic tracing para-
digm has substantial intuitive appeal. Notions of vindicating title, of
assessment of the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiffs loss. The first element, there-
fore-the defendant's inappropriate receipt of a benefit-and not the characterization of the
defendant's wrongful act, gives restitution a distinctive flavor. Restitution focuses not on
compensating the plaintiff for his losses as is common in tort and contract law, but on the
unfairly enhanced position of the defendant, and operates to strip him of his benefit. This
approach characterizes restitution both when it provides alternative relief for wrongs defined
by other fields of the private law, and when it operates on its own. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 202 comment c (1936); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 133 ("Restitu-
tion is generally awarded only in order to deprive the defendant of an enrichment obtained at
the plaintiffs expense. . ").
9 The precise boundaries of this branch of law are not well defined. Although many
writers exclude common law actions of trover, trespass to chattels, trespass for mesne profits,
detinue, replevin, and eject.ment, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION Introductory Note
to ch. 7 (1936), these actions may provide a form of relief very similar to the more traditional
restitutionary doctrines. See Oesterle, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REv. 336, 338-39 (1980). The
literature is ambivalent on whether to define the field through the principle of unjust enrich-
ment or by reference to a few select historic doctrines. See id Restitution is most commonly
understood, however, as a grab bag ofjudge-made rules developed originally in both the early
Anglo-American law and equity courts. See Dawson, supra note 8, at 564. The law courts
created the common counts in general assumpsit, known by their specific names of "work and
labor done" (quantum meruit), "money had and received," "goods sold and delivered" (quan-
tum valebant), and "money lent." The equity courts developed the doctrines of specific restitu-
tion, constructive trust, equitable accounting, contribution, and indemnity. Seegeneral 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 1, §§ 1.2, 1.5. Many of these doctrines began as fictional outgrowths of
established bodies of law; the common counts began as fictional contracts, and the construc-
tive trust began as a fictional trust. As far back as 1888, commentators sought to unify the
application of these ancient doctrines under the mantle of unjust enrichment, see, e.g., Ames,
The Hitory ofAssumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 53, 64 (1888), and in 1936 the Restatement of
Restitution recognized and legitimized the new field.
English courts have not yet explicitly recognized any generalized right to restitution in
cases of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Orakpo v. Manson Invs. Ltd., 1978 A.C. 95, 104. Their
reluctance is grounded in the fear that the principle of unjust enrichment is too vague to be of
practical value as a legal rule. See, e.g., Baylis v. Bishop of London, I Ch. 127, 140 (1913)
("To ask what course would be ex aequo et bona to both sides never was a very precise
guide. . . .'); see also Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contrats-I, 10 HARv. L. REv. 209, 226 (1896).
But see Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARv. L. REv. 249 (1897).
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deterring misappropriation, of disgorging unlawfully acquired profits,
and even in the very simple case of measuring accurately the victims
true loss all seem to coalesce in support of the result. The tinsel attrac-
tiveness of the paradigm no doubt contributes to the expansiveness of
tracing doctrines in current jurisprudence.
Even cursory attention to the defining concepts reveals the power
and wide-ranging application of tracing doctrine. The claimant's origi-
nal property interest-which forms the basis of a right to trace into sub-
stitute property-can be equitable as well as legal and includes, for
example, a creditor's security interest in a debtor's property. Indeed,
tracing originated as a device enabling beneficiaries of trusts to assert
claims to specific property that trustees had realized privately from pri-
vate dealings with the trust res. 10 The property interest misappropri-
ated may be in virtually any kind of identifiable property: land, money,
bank accounts, tangible goods, stock, notes, or even an entry in a com-
puter memory bank. In addition, the types of misappropriation that
1o The first appearance of the tracing remedy in Chancery decisions is hard to pinpoint.
A scholar familiar with Chancery's earliest records (the Decree and Order Books kept about
the time of Elizabeth I (1558-1603)) has stated:
[E]arly Chancery reports are so brief and uninformative that they disclose no
real clues on the subject. . . . If trust assets were wrongfully used by the
trustee himself for the acquisition of other assets, it seems unlikely that there
would have been any scruple about ordering restoration of the newly ac-
quired assets ...
J. DAWsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 26-27 (1951). After 1660, Chancery cases were regularly
reported. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 94 (1979). The first
recognizable claim for tracing relief appeared in Kirk v. Webb, Prec. Ch. 85, 24 Eng. Rep. 41
(1698). In Kirk, the trustee had converted a portion of the trust res into land and devised it.
The beneficiary sued the devisees, asking for title to the land. The Chancellors denied the
claim, reasoning that an award of the land to the beneficiary would contravene the recently
enacted Statute of Frauds (1677).
The procedural history ofKirk reveals the status of tracing claims in 1698. Upon hearing
the Master's report, the Lord Chancellor was initially of the opinion that "the lands might be
followed." Id at 87, 24 Eng. Rep. at 42. The defendants, arguing that "it was a matter of
great consequence, and never done before," convinced the Lord Chancellor to include Justice
Powell and the Master of the Rolls in the deliberations. ,See id Eventually, the three Chan-
cellors decided against the beneficiary and refused to give him title to the devised land. The
Lord Chancellor and Justice Powell believed themselves bound by the Statute of Frauds. See
id The Master of the Rolls, however, noted, that "if it had been expressly and plainly proved
that these purchases had been made with the profits of the trust estate, . . . it might have
been otherwise." Id Several cases followed Kirk in denying the relief. E.g., Cox v. Bateman,
2 Ves. Sen. 19, 28 Eng. Rep. 13 (1715); Hooper v. Eyles, 2 Vern 480, 23 Eng. Rep. 908 (1704);
Heron v. Heron, Prec. Ch. 163, 24 Eng. Rep. 78 (1701); Newton v. Preston, Prec. Ch. 103, 24
Eng. Rep. 50 (1699). This line of cases, however, was overruled 50 years later in Lane v.
Dighton, Amb. 409, 27 Eng. Rep. 274 (1762) (citing Ryall v. Ryall, I Atk. 59, 26 Eng. Rep.
39 (1739)).
The first reported Chancery case in which a tracing argument appeared to succeed was
Burdett v. Willett, 2 Vern. 638, 23 Eng. Rep. 1017 (1708), in which the Chancellors required
a factor to remit to his principal the economic product of consigned goods. See also
Whitecomb v. Jacob, 1 Salk. 160, 91 Eng. Rep. 149 (1710). But see injfa note 31.
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may give rise to tracing are highly varied: breach of trust1 1 or fiduciary
duty,' 2 conversion,' 3 fraud,1 4 mistake,' 5 certain breaches of contract,'
6
11 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 162, 194 N.W. 548, 549
(1923) ("[W]here money held upon trust is misapplied by the trustee, and traced into an
unauthorized investment in property of any nature, the investment thus made,. . . may be
treated by the cestui que trust as made for his benefit ."); Erie Trust Co.'s Case (No. 1), 326 Pa.
198, 191 A. 613 (1937). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959); G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRUSTEES §§ 921-30 (1978); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1,
§§ 2.14-.20; R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 540 (1972); 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, §§ 508-522.
The right occasionally is declared in statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2243 (West 1954);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 108-424, 108-425 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59.01.06 (1960); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 55-1-9 (1980).
12 In the late nineteenth century Anglo-American courts declared that tracing claims
reach all fiduciaries who violate their duties. It is difficult to ascertain when this rule first
appeared. The position was clearly stated in In re Hallet's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696, 709, 710,
713-14 (1879), an opinion that cited Whitecomb v. Jacob, 1 Salk. 161, 91 Eng. Rep. 149
(1710) for support. The Whitecomb case, however, can be explained on other grounds. See
infra note 31. Early American cases in accord with Hallet's Estate include Humphreys v.
Butler, 51 Ark. 351 (1888); National Mahaiwe Bank v. Barry, 125 Mass. 20 (1878); American
Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N.Y. 552 (1895).
A fiduciary can wrongfully appropriate a variety of interests and trigger tracing rights in
the principal. For example, courts hold that an employee who receives trade secrets in confi-
dence during the normal course of his employment, and uses the secrets himself, must account
for all profits that he received from the improper use. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dimissed, 423 U.S: 802 (1975); Clark v.
Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); International Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Co., 248
F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957); Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1944); Hoeltke v. C.M.
Kemp Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1936). Similarly, if a fiduci-
ary sells or otherwise profits personally from the use of confidential information, and the
wronged beneficiary can identify the fund or property so acquired, the beneficiary may im-
pose a constructive trust upon the fund or property. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 200 (1936). If a fiduciary diverts assets that he should have acquired on behalf of the bene-
ficiary, the beneficary may claim an equitable interest in the diverted assets, minus a credit
for the personal funds used by the fiduciary in the purchase. See, e.g., Wilson v. Jenning, 344
Mass. 608, 619, 184 N.E.2d 642, 648 (1962); Casari v. Victoria Amusement Enters., Inc., 327
Pa. 382, 388-89, 194 A. 503, 506-07 (1937). See generaly RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 194 comment b (1936). A fiduciary who acquires an asset or profits through a business that
competes with the business of the principal is said to hold the sset or profits in constructive
trust for the principal. See, e.g., Des Moines Terminal Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry., 52 F.2d
616 (8th Cir. 1931) (competing with beneficiary in business held violative of fiduciary duties
in favor of beneficary); see also Sequoia Vacuum Sys. v. Stranksy, 229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 40
Cal. Rptr. 203 (1964) (constructive trust the implicit remedy). The extreme case involves a
principal claiming the profit acquired by a fiduciary when the principal never expected or
intended the fiduciary to acquire the profit on the principal's behalf. E.g., Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969) (corporation claims prof-
its received by officers and directors through inside trading).
13 Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877), extended the doctrine of constructive trust to
all cases of conversion: "We are of opinion that the absence of the conventional relation of
trustee and cestui que trust between the plaintiff and the [thieves], is no obstacle to giving the
plaintiff the benefit of the notes and mortgage, or the proceeds in part of the stolen bonds."
Id at 140. American courts before Newton had consistently rejected the argument. See, e.g.,
Pascoag Bank v. Hunt, 3 Edw. Ch. 583 (N.Y. 1842). Some courts continued to resist after
Newton, e.g., Nert Bros. v. Dogge, 27 Neb. 256, 42 N.W. 1035 (1889), but by the twentieth
century the case was established doctrine. Justice Story was ahead of the times. In the 1834
and 1839 editions of his Commentaries on EquityJurisrudence, he stated the position later taken
by Judge Andrews in Newton as if it were already established law. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTA-
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RIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1258, at 503 (2d ed. 1839). After Newton, later editors of
the Story teatise simply added a citation of the case to Story's early text. See, e.g., 3 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1666 n.5, at 306 (14th ed. 1918). English
courts, however, have refused to foll6w Newton despite continuing criticism. See R. GOFF & G.
JONES, supra note 1, at 53-60.
14 Cunningham v. Pettigrew, 169 F. 335, 340 (8th Cir. 1909); Brennan v. Persselli, 353
I1. 630, 637, 187 N.E. 820, 822 (1933); Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 201, 135 N.E. 243, 244
(1922); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N.Y. 552, 561, 40 N.E. 206, 209 (1895).
15 In re Berry, 147 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1906); In re Woods, 121 F. 599, 602 (D. Ga.
1903).
16 Clark v. McCIeery, 115 Iowa 3, 87 N.W. 696 (1901) (subrogation); Colby v. Street,
146 Minn. 290, 178 N.W. 599 (1920) (specific restitution on traced property); Matthews v.
Crowder, 111 Tenn. 737, 69 N.W. 779 (1902) (equitable lien on traced property). The facts in
Clark aptly illustrate the potential range of Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877). See supra
note 13. In Clark, the plaintiff had contracted to exchange his land in one state for an inter-
vener's farm in another state. The intervener conveyed her farm to the plaintiff who, in turn,
sold it and took a mortgage for the purchase price. 115 Iowa at 4, 87 N.W. at 697. Plaintiff
failed to convey his land as agreed, and in his action against the defendant to foreclose the
mortgage on what had been the intervener's farm, the intervener prayed for rescission of her
contract with the plaintiff and subrogation to his rights under the mortgage. i at 5, 87 N.W.
at 697. The court granted her prayer. I'd at 7, 87 N.W. at 698.
The above decisions aside, the use of tracing in breach of contract cases is largely unex-
plored in the case law. For a discussion of the issue, see generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1,
§ 4.10(a); Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 182-83 (1959); Recent Deci-
sion, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1290, 1290-91 (1935). A possible theory of tracing in such cases could
be as follows: when an appropriate remedy for the defendant's breach is the return in specie of
an asset transferred by the plaintiff, and this requires relief in equity (for example, a decree
ordering the reconveyance of land), courts, drawing on their powers derived from the old
equity courts, can operate through the use of the constructive trust. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1936). If the plaintiff can claim a constructive trust on the trans-
ferred asset, he should also be able to claim a constructive trust over any of its products-that
is, he should be able to trace into the products of the transferred asset.
The Restatement of Restitution, however, is not explicit on the matter. It notes that full
tracing relief may be used only against the "conscious wrongdoer"--one who, for example,
"obtains property from the claimant by fraud, duress or undue influence, or. . . intentional
conver[sion of] the property of the claimant." Id § 202 comment b. Limited tracing relief
applies against "innocent converts" (defendants who acquire stolen goods without knowledge,
for example) and gratuitous donees. Id §§ 203, 204. If courts allow tracing in contract cases,
is a breaching party a member of the former or latter class? Or should the culpability of the
breaching party be individually assessed in each case? But cf. Dawson, supra note 8, at 577
(the "distinction. . . between knowing and ignorant. . . should be irrelevant where restitu-
tion has been used by American courts in the unwinding of contracts."). Professor Palmer
appears to favor very limited tracing in contract cases. He would allow tracing for a contract
breach only to give the plaintiff limited aid in collecting his otherwise-available money judg-
ment, by securing that judgment with specific traceable assets. See I G. PALMER, supra note 1,
§ 4.10(a). The lien is largely toothless, however, for Professor Palmer would not use it to grant
priority over other creditors. See id § 4.10(a), at 453.
The reason why the case law is sparse on the matter is easy to see. Claimants rarely
request tracing because few cases grant specific relief in equity for the return of transferred
property after a contract is broken. For example, in land sale cases, if a vendor conveys title
without placing a condition subsequent or some analogous clause in the deed, and the vendee
breaches, courts commonly deny specific restitution. E.g., Emigrant Co. v. County of Adams,
100 U.S. 61 (1879); Covington v. Butlter, 242 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 1970); State v. LoBue, 83 Nev.
221, 427 P.2d 639 (1967), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); see S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 1456 (3d ed. 1970). Standard means exist for making the grantee's title defea-
sible on his breach through the reservation of either a power of termination or a possibility of
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or the wrongful disposition of collateral by a debtor.1 7 In each of these
situations, tracing doctrine provides an alternate remedy to a money
judgment, or to a suit against a third party for the original property
misappropriated. Indeed, the primary limitation on the scope of the
right to trace is the ignorance of lawyers as to its availability.
Tracing is most useful to a claimant when it provides him with a
reverter, and the courts hesitate to give the grantor rights equivalent to those that he failed to
retain expressly. A few exceptions to the general rule against specific relief exist, however,
and, if appropriate, one could argue for tracing in these cases. The best-known exception
arises when the plaintiff conveys land in consideration for the defendant's promise to provide
the plaintiff support. If the grantee fails to provide support, the court will cancel the deed.
See, e.g., Caramini v. Tegulias, 121 Conn. 548, 186 A. 482 (1936); see R. POWELL, supra note
11, § 901. If such a defendant sells the land to a third party, some courts hold that because
the grantor was the equitable owner of the land, the grantor may claim the proceeds of the
second sale or the assets purchased with those proceeds, a tracing remedy. See, e.g., Colby v.
Street, 146 Minn. 290, 178 N.W. 599 (1920).
In contracts for the sale of personal property.in which the seller has parted with both
possession and title, courts also regularly refuse the seller specific restitution of the goods if the
buyer breaches. As with grantors of real property, courts are unwilling to accord the seller a
de facto security interest in the goods when he has failed to preserve expressly such an interest
for himself. Some statutory exceptions exist, however. For example, although the Uniform
Commercial Code limits the seller to an action for the price, see U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(a) (1978), if
the seller discovers that the buyer is insolvent, he may, in limited circumstances, reclaim the
goods within 10 days of receipt. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). Cash sales, in which delivery and
payment are intended to be concurrent, provide another exception. The seller can also re-
claim the goods if the buyer acquires possession through a dishonored check. In re Mort Co.,
208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962); U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2), 2-511(2), (3) (1978). Thus, tracing
could be argued as applicable in those few cases in which the buyer sells or exchanges goods
while the seller still has a right to reclaim them under § 2-702 or § 2-507. Section 2-702 cases
may support the tracing argument better than do § 2-507 cases, however, because the seller's
right of reclamation in cash sales is an outgrowth of a common law title theory. See S. WIL-
LISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 341 (rev. ed. 1958); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ. 1057, 1060-61 (1954) (title in cash sales is said not to pass until
price is paid and hence seller can recover possession at law on strength of his title).
The application of tracing to contract cases, however, should not ultimately depend on
the technicalities attendant to the old forms of equitable relief. Rather, two issues arise. First,
should a breaching defendant-a vendor who sells land to a third party for more money, for
example-retain any benefit? See 1 G. PALMER, siupra note 1, § 4.9; Dawson, supra, at 186-89.
Second, should traditional tracing rules measure that benefit? I favor a negative answer to
both questions. The second issue is the subject of this article. The first issue is subject to
considerable debate. An award to the plaintiff in excess of lost profits may deter breaches that
we wish to encourage. Compare R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (2d ed. 1977)
(lost profit measure ensures that we permit breaches that promote economic efficiency) with 1
G. PALMER, supra note 1, at 442. See also Marcneil, Ejicient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sk,
68 VA, L. REV. 947 (1982).
17 See U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978); infra notes 76-85. In a similar view, most American juris-
dictions, either by statute or common law, permit creditors to claim property that the debtor
conveys in order to frustrate creditors. See generaly UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT §§ 4-8 (1918) (adopted in over 23 states). Under § 9 of the U.F.C.A., a creditor proving
the existence of a fraudulent conveyance may bring an action to set the conveyance aside or
ignore the transfer and levy on the property in the hands of the transferee. This right to claim
the property in the hands of the transferee may arguably support tracing relief. For example,
Debtor fraudulently conveys his automobile to Third Party. Third Party exchanges the auto-
mobile for a motorcycle. Can the creditors of Debtor trace into the motorcycle?
larger recovery than he would have received had he sought a simple
money judgment. 18 Frequently a careful lawyer can significantly aug-
18 A claimant's right to trace misappropriated property, whether the product is in the
hands of the wrongdoer, a third person, or both, can pose tricky election-of-remedies issues.
Initially, the claimant must choose between a money judgment (either in damages or in
quasi-contract) and tracing. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 16 comment e (1936); id
§ 68. Early courts, consistent with the trust origins of the tracing doctrine, spoke of affirming
the acts of the wrongdoer if tracing relief was selected and of disaffirming the acts of the
wrongdoer if damages were sought. See id § 68; Note, Election of Remedies: A Delusion, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 292, 294-95 (1938). A similar election to affirm the acts of the wrongdoer
was said to occur if the plaintiff chose quasi-contract rather than damages as a method of
calculating the size ofa moneyjudgment. The timing requirements imposed on the plaintiff's
choice however can be troublesome. Great variety exists in the applicable rules, and unwary
plaintiffs may find themselves unintentionally selecting a less-than-optimal remedy. Seegener-
aly Hine, Election ofRemedies: A Criticism, 26 HARV. L. REv. 707 (1918); Patterson, Improve-
ments in the Law ofRestitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 667, 679 (1955). See also Oesterle,supra note 9,
at 343-50 (discussing Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 860 (1978)). Some states require the plaintiff to make his election before the case is
submitted to the court for factfinding. See, e.g., Billman v. Ace Restaurant Supply Co., 5
Ariz. App. 56, 423 P.2d 132 (1967); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954);
Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975). Other states allow the plaintiff to
take more than one theory to verdict. See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Kapplin, 122 Ga. App.
51, 176 S.E.2d 207 (1970); Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 745, 537 P.2d 807
(1975). A few states apparently allow the trial judge to select the appropriate time for elec-
tion. See, e.g., Lukaris v. Harrison Vending Sys., Inc., 28 A.D.2d 1019, 283 N.Y.S.2d 674
(1967). The election, of course, may be expressly declared in the pleadings or on the record
before the court. The plaintiff may make the election in other ways, however, and without
knowing that his acts constitute a permanent election. Some early authorities hold, for exam-
ple, that if the plaintiff manifests an intent to seek damages before suit is filed, he is barred
later from seeking restitutionary relief even though the defendant did not rely on the plain-
tiff's communication. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 68(1) (1936); Hine, supra, at
709-10.
The election between tracing and a money judgment is not without conditions. Under
the traditional rule, if the plaintiff asks for tracing as a remedy for violations historically
originating in the law courts (breach of contract and conversion, for example), the court must
find that the legal remedy (in damages or in quasi-contract) is inadequate before it may grant
tracing relief. See American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N.Y. 552, 561, 49 N.E. 206,
209 (1895); see also International Refugee Org. v. Maryland Drydock Co., 179 F.2d 284 (4th
Cir. 1950). The condition is a product of an English jurisdictional rule that equity courts
could not grant relief if an adequate legal remedy was available in the common law courts.
See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 296-380 (1950). The classic reasons sustaining a
claim that the legal remedy is inadequate are: (a) the property involved is unique and dam-
ages cannot replace it, (b) the damages cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, or (c)
the defendant is insolvent. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
§§ 43-47 (2d ed. 1948). When law and equity merged in many American courts, the old rule
remained to establish, in effect, priorities among various types of relief; legal relief was pre-
ferred to equitable relief when the legal remedy was "plain and adequate." See Boyce's Ex'rs
v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210 (1830). Thus, the right to use tracing as a remedy for some
substantive claims may depend on its classification as solely an equitable remedy, a doubtful
analysis in American jurisprudence. See infla note 28. Note, however, that even if one as-
sumes that tracing relief is solely equitable, the adequacy test does not apply if the substantive
right sued upon is based on doctrine developed by the equity courts. See D. DOBBS, supra note
1, at 60-61; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra, at 102. Thus, all breaches of fiduciary duty may subject
the offender to tracing relief regardless of the adequacy of a money judgment. See, e.g., Noble
v. Noble, 198 Cal. 129, 243 P. 439 (1926). Where the adequacy test does apply, some modem
commentators argue that the mere fact that the tracing remedy is more advantageous to the
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ment his client's recovery by choosing tracing relief.1 9 For example,
plaintiff satisfies the adequacy standard. G. BOGERT, supra note 11, § 472; 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 1, § 2.19, at 218; cf Jennings & Shapiro, The Minnesota Law of Constructive Trusts and
Analogous Equitable Remedies, 25 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1941) (adequacy doctrine is immaterial to
tracing because the equitable ownership right predates the court decree). But see J. DAWSON,
supra note 10, at 32:
The notion of an equitable ownership, produced by tracing, appears most
clearly in those exceptional cases where the constructive trustee is solvent and
a money judgment remedy appears entirely adequate. The modem cases that
hold this factor irrelevant seem to me to provide the most perfect example of
circularity.
Some courts agree with Professor Dawson, but others do not; many apparently ignore the
issue (perhaps as a result of defendants' failure to raise it properly). See I G. PALMER, supra
note 1, § 2.190. In any event, although the initial reason for the adequacy doctrine-the
deference of equitable courts to thejurisdiction of the legal courts-has long been abandoned,
the doctrine retains surprising vitality. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 526 (1979)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[F]or centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused to grant equi-
table relief unless the plaintiff could show that his remedy at law was inadequate."). The
survival of the doctrine should depend on a formulation of new moorings: namely, do the
priorities in type of relief have some valid policy justification? The position of most modem
commentators, diluting the adequacy test to a choice of the most advantageous remedy, im-
plicitly answers in the negative.
Once the claimant elects tracing relief, a second election is necessary if the misappropri-
ated property or its products are found in the hands of one or more third parties. The victim
must choose between recovering the property held by the third party and recovering the
traceable property held by the wrongdoer. For example, Wrongdoer, in breach of trust, sells
land to Transferee, who takes with notice of the breach. If Owner could proceed against both
Wrongdoer and Transferee without election between them, he could claim a double recov-
ery-a constructive trust on the sale proceeds in the hands of Wrongdoer and also a claim to
the land in the hands of Transferee. To prevent this, courts attempt to force the claimant
either to sue Wrongdoer for the sales proceeds and Transferee for delivery of the property
with credit for the sales price, or to sue Transferee alone for delivery of the property without a
credit for the sales price. Suarez v. de Montigny, 1 A.D. 494, 37 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1896) (pur-
chaser not given credit for purchase price because beneficiaries did not recover proceeds of
sale from trustee). Even in the latter election if the trust has been actually credited with part
of the payment price by the wrongdoer, the court must similarly credit the Transferee if the
property in his hands is returned. See, e.g., King v. Richardson, 136 F.2d 849, 865 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943) ("[Tlhe transferee is entitled to credit for the amount which
he paid for the trust property to the extent to which the trust estate has the benefit thereof.');
Marx v. Clisby, 130 Ala. 502, 511-12, 30 So. 517, 521 (1900) ("It is deemed unconscionable
that the heirs or devisees shall reap the fruits of the purchaser's payment of money, appropri-
ated to the discharge of debts which were a charge on the lands, and at the same time recover
the lands.').
19 The choice also may affect the plaintiff's right to ajury trial. A constitutional right to
a jury trial in cases "at common law" exists in the federal courts. See U.S. CONsT. amend.
VII. Most states have a similar provision. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1894) (amended
1938). Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the type of relief requested, not the pro-
cedural character of the action, determines whether the right exists. See, e.g., Ross v. Bern-
hard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10, 542-43 (1970) (although derivative suit is a creature of equity,
jury trial is required because the plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract and negli-
gence). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (request for simple
accounting is a legal remedy, based on old common law action of account). Thus, if tracing is
deemed to be an equitable remedy, see inra note 28, a demand for tracing relief may defeat a
plaintiff's request for a jury trial. The issue is not free from considerable confusion. Lan-
guage in Supreme Court cases arguably suggests that the Court would provide a jury trial to
plaintiffs who seek equitable relief on common law violations for which the legal remedy is
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against a solvent wrongdoer, tracing may provide the claimant with
more than he lost by permitting recovery of an asset that is more valua-
ble than the misappropriated property.20 Against an insolvent wrong-
doer tracing may augment the claimant's recovery under a money
judgment by: (1) giving him priority over other claimants; 21 (2) en-
abling him to reach otherwise exempt assets; 22 or (3) allowing him to sue
solvent third parties who have traceable property. 23 More than one of
inadequate. Presumably, the Court would grant a jury trial on the legal issues and then add
equitable remedies consistent with the jury's verdict. Therefore, the fact that tracing is an
equitable remedy would not by itself determine whether the plaintiff had a right to a jury
trial; the nature of the substantive claim would be determinative. In contrast, some commen-
tators argue that the Supreme Court has recast the law-equity distinction for purposes of the
seventh amendment into a "simpler" distinction between money judgments and in personam
orders, such as injunctions or specific performance. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 78.
This distinction, however, is not always "simpler" and questions still remain: because a con-
structive-trust decree is traditionally an in prsonam order for the return of identified property,
does the plaintiff lack any right to ajury trial if constructive-trust relief is requested? What is
an equitable lien under this test? Although traditionally viewed as an in personam command,
in effect an equitable lien serves merely to secure a money judgment.
20 For example, if Wrongdoer embezzles $10,000 from Owner, and with the funds
purchases land that increases in value to $15,000, Owner may claim the land and receive a
windfall of $5,000. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Stordahl, 353 Mich. 354, 91 N.W.2d
533 (1958) (when misappropriated money used to purchase real estate or personal property of
any kind, beneficiary entitled to property); Thompson v. Nesheim, 280 Minn. 407, 159
N.W.2d 910 (1968) (when misappropriated money used as partial payment on property, ben-
eficiary entitled to equal share in improved property); Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 51
Neb. 546, 71 N.W. 294 (1897) (when misappropriated money used to buy property, benefici-
ary entitled to improved property).
21 Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935) (claimant given
priority in receivership); In re Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1935) (claimant given prior-
ity in bankruptcy); Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000 (D.N.D. 1978) (claimant
given priority over federal tax lien); Powell v. Missouri & Ark. Land & Mining Co., 99 Ark.
553, 139 S.W. 299 (1911) (claimant given priority in administration of insolvent decedent's
estate); Lucianna v. Hip Sing Ass'n, 256 A.2d 898 (D.C. 1969) (claimant given priority over
judgment creditor); Meyner v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 29 NJ. 210, 148 A.2d 585
(1959) (claimant given priority over partnership creditor).
22 The two major examples of exempt assets that ordinary creditors cannot reach are
homestead property and life insurance proceeds. Courts, however, regularly allow tracing
into both. See, e.g., Shinn v. McPherson, 58 Cal. 596, 599 (1881) (homestead laws not meant
"to be a secure and impregnable asylum in which to deposit peculations from others'); Jones
v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925) (homestead property); Long v. Earle, 277 Mich.
505, 520, 269 N.W. 577, 582 (1936) (court restricted relief to a lien on homestead property but
stated "it was never contemplated or intended. . . that a homestead could be created and
maintained with stolen or embezzled property, or with property wrongfully converted which
rightfully belonged to the beneficiaries of a trust fund'); see also G. BOGERT, supra note 11,
§ 925 (life insurance); 5 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 508.4 (life insurance); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d
672 (1952) (life insurance); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1415 (1926) (homestead property).
23 Tracing doctrine operates against innocent transferees who receive no legal title and
transferees who are not bona fide purchasers and receive legal but not equitable title. If
either type of transferee exchanges the acquired property for other property, or receives in-
come from the acquired property, tracing may apply. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITuTION
§§ 204, 205 (1936); infra note 159-98 and accompanying text; see also Hartford Nat'l Bank v.
Westchester Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 555 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1977); Air Traffic Conference v.
Downtown Travel Center, 87 Misc. 2d 151, 383 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Banes Estate,
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these advantages may arise in the same case. For example, a claimant
may trace an asset into the hands of an insolvent defendant when the
asset is worth more than the claimant's actual loss. 24 The plaintiff in
such a case is able not only to claim appreciated property, but also to
achieve priority over other creditors.
Although tracing is viewed as a remedy, it is itself implemented
through a number of more specific remedial devices: constructive trust,
equitable lien, and subrogation. For example, if a trustee wrongfully
sells or exchanges the trust res for other property and personally retains
the product, the wronged beneficiary may claim an equitable ownership
interest in the substitute assets. This proprietary right in the substitute
assets derives from the beneficiary's equitable interest in the trust res
and, therefore, is subject to his ability to identify assets in the hands of
the trustee that can be traced through a series of exchanges back to trust
property. The beneficiary is entitled to exercise his proprietary right in
the substitute assets either by obtaining a constructive-trust decree or-
dering the errant trustee to transfer the assets in specie to the benefici-
ary,25 or by enforcing an equitable lien upon the assets equal to the
452 Pa. 388, 305 A.2d 723 (1973). In some cases, tracing merely secures a victim's recovery
against the transferee on nontracing theories of relief by creating an equitable lien on specific
property. In other cases, tracing augments other forms of recovery by reaching the "direct
product" income in the hands of the transferee and, in a few cases, tracing provides the sole
basis of relief against a transferee. The last circumstance is illustrated as follows: Wrongdoer
acquires a cow from Owner through fraud. Wrongdoer gives the cow to Donee, who has no
notice of the fraud and pays no value. Donee exchanges the cow for some sheep. Tracing
permits Owner to assert an equitable ownership interest in Donee's sheep.
24 Professors Palmer and Scott disagree on whether specific restitution is proper in this
case. Compare 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.14 ("When the claim is against an insolvent
estate . . . the controversy is essentially between the claimant and general creditors of the
insolvent, and the claimant usually should be limited to recovery of the amount taken from
him.") with 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 508 ("It is immaterial that the wrongdoer is insolvent,
for his creditors, not being purchasers for value, are not entitled to any interest in the claim-
ant's property or its product."). The Restatement of Restitution reflects the views of its au-
thor, Professor Scott. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comment e (1936). See also
Kemp v. Elmer Co., 56 F.2d 657, 658 (S.D. Cal. 1932), modifwd, 67 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1933)
(adopting Professor Scott's approach); Smith v. Township of Au Gres, 150 F. 257, 261 (6th
Cir. 1906) (adopting Professsor Palmer's approach).
25 In a constructive-trust case, the defendant is said to hold the property as trustee for
the plaintiff and has an equitable duty to convey that propcrty to the plaintiff. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 162, 194 N.W. 548, 549 (1923). Thus, the typical
decree orders the defendant to transfer title in the property to the plaintiff. Jud Whitehead
Heater Co. v. Obler, 111 Cal. App. 2d 861, 245 P.2d 608 (1952); Nebraska Nat'l Bank v.
Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71 N.W. 294 (1897). Originally equity operated solely in personam, so
that the court could not vest title in the plaintiff through the constructive-trust decree, but
could only order, with threat of contempt, that the defendant effect a transfer of title to the
plaintiff. See C. HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY (1915). The merger
of law and equity and the evolution of the constructive-trust remedy, however, have led
courts to decree routinely that a constructive-trust judgment vests title. See, e.g., Buggell v.
Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F. Supp. 893 (D. Vt. 1960); McCreary v. Shields, 333 Mich. 290,
296, 52 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1952).
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value of the misappropriated trust res.26 The beneficiary's choice, of
course, will depend on the value of the substitute assets at the time of
judgment. 27
The thesis of this article is that tracing is largely unprincipled; more
often than not it fails to implement the principle of unjust enrichment,
which is the heart of restitutionary theory. Tracing often overstates the
defendant's gain from the misappropriation and discriminates unreason-
ably between victims of misappropriation, between the defendant's
creditors and the victims of misappropriation, and between innocent
third parties who receive property from the defendant. The argument
proceeds as follows. Section II explains the origins and growth of trac-
ing and distinguishes the argument in this article from other recent criti-
cisms of tracing relief. Sections III and IV explain the theoretical
deficiencies in the doctrine. Inappropriate applications of the doctrine
26 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 161, 202 (1936). An equitable lien decree orders
the holder of the property subject to the lien to pay the amount of the lien or suffer execution
on the identified property. The most often cited early explanation for the choice between a
constructive trust and an equitable lien is the following passage from In re Hallett's Estate, 13
Ch. D. 696 (1879):
[T]he beneficial owner has a right to elect either to take the property
purchased, or to hold it as a security for the amount of the trust money laid
out in the purchase; or, as we generally express it, he is entitled at his election
either to take the property, or to have a charge on the property for the
amount of the trust money.
Id at 709. For other cases supporting the choice between a constructive trust and an equita-
ble lien, see Loring v. Baker, 329 Mass. 63, 106 N.E.2d 434 (1952); Thompson v. Nesheim, 280
Minn. 407, 159 N.W.2d 910 (1968); McGurk v. Moore, 234 N.C. 248, 67 S.E.2d 53 (1951).
Tracing may also result in a decree for subrogation if the trustee uses traceable property
in discharging an obligation owed by the trustee or a lien upon other property of the trustee.
Cotton v. Dacey, 61 F. 481 (D. Kan. 1894); Whalen v. Marling, 176 Wis. 441, 187 N.W. 169
(1922). In such a situation, the court gives the plaintiff rights similar to those that the obligee
or lien-holder enjoyed before the lien was discharged. The plaintiff is said to be subrogated to
the position of the obligee or lien-holder. If the trustee wrongfully used traceable property to
discharge the debt or lien at a discount, the beneficiary is entitled to be subrogated for the full
amount of the debt or lien and thus may profit from the subrogation. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 162 comment i (1936).
27 Consider the following example. Wrongdoer is the trustee of Blackacre for the benefit
of Beneficiary. In breach of the trust, Wrongdoer exchanges Blackacre for personal title to
Greenacre. At the time of the exchange Blackacre is worth $100,000. If Greenacre is worth
$150,000 at the time ofjudgment, Beneficiary may claim Greenacre and secure a handsome
profit (assuming that the interest collectible on a personal judgment against Wrongdoer is less
than $50,000) by charging Wrongdoer as a constructive trustee. If Greenacre, at the time of
judgment, is worth $90,000, Beneficiary may enforce an equitable lien on Greenacre for
$100,000 (plus interest if allowed). The land is then sold; Beneficiary receives the $90,000 in
proceeds and has a residual personal claim against Wrongdoer for the deficiency.
The different forms of relief---equitable lien, constructive trust, and subrogation-may
be combined to maximize the plaintiff's recovery. Thus, if Wrongdoer sells Blackacre in
breach of trust for $100,000, and uses $90,000 of the proceeds to buy Greenacre (worth
$150,000 at the time ofjudgment), and uses $10,000 to buy Whiteacre (worth $5,000 at the
time ofjudgment), then Beneficiary can claim title to Greenacre through a constructive trust
decree and enforce an equitable lien of $10,000 on Whiteacre. This yields $5,000 in proceeds
through an execution of the lien and a residual claim against Wrongdber of $5,000.
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augment the significance of these deficiencies; tracing is too often al-
lowed to override and distort the remedial schemes of the bodies of law
addressing distinct policy issues. To illustrate this theme, section V fo-
cuses on creditors' remedies against insolvent debtors, and section VI
examines the harsh effect of the doctrine on innocent transferees of mis-
appropriated property. If I am correct, courts should curtail the use of
tracing, and courts and legislatures should reconsider statutory schemes
that adopt tracing principles, like Article Nine of the UCC. Finally, in
section VII, I note that the same arguments used against tracing apply
against other restitutionary doctrines, particularly the flagship of restitu-
tion--quasi-contract. Thus, other rules in the law of restitution should
also be reconsidered in light of their efficacy in measuring unjust
enrichment.
II
THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF TRACING
The doctrine of tracing evolved over several hundred years. Its
birth was understandable: to provide relief against errant trustees, Eng-
lish equity courts granted beneficiaries a proprietary right to follow mis-
appropriated property into its product. 28 This derivative right in traced
28 There is vigorous debate in England over the scope of a right to trace at common law.
See, e.g., Goode, The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial Transactions, 92 LAw. Q. REv.
360 (1976); Khurshid & Matthews, Tracing Confiusion, 95 LAw Q. REv. 78 (1979); Pearce, A
Tracing Paper, 40 THE CONVEYENCER 277 (1976); Scott, The Right to "Trace" at Common Law, 7
U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 463 (1966). The debate may affect the right to ajury trial of those who
seek to trace in this country's courts. See supra note 19.
The argument centers around the case of Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562, 105 Eng. Rep.
721 (1815) (Ellenborough, J.). In Taylor the defendant gave his broker a banker's draft with
instructions to buy exchequer bills on the defendant's account. The broker used part of the
proceeds to buy other securities and bullion for his own account. The broker then became
insolvent and tried to flee the country, but was caught by the defendant. The broker had the
securities and bullion in his possession and the defendant appropriated them. The broker's
assignees in bankruptcy sued the defendant in trover for the property. The suit failed, how-
ever, because the defendant argued successfully that he owned a beneficial interest in the
property:
It makes no difference in reason or law into what other form, different from
the original, the change may have been made,. . . for the product of or sub-
stitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself, as long
as it can be ascertained to be such, and the right only ceases when the means
of ascertainment fail ....
Id at 575, 105 Eng. Rep. at 726.
Early American textbook writers believed that because the defendant could trace into
the securities and bullion to defend in trover, the case allowed a plaintiff to trace and to sue in
trover or detinue (if, for example, the assignees rather than the client had caught the fleeing
broker and the client sued the assignees for the securities and bullion). E.g., 2 J. STORY, supra
note 13, § 1258, at 503-04. American decisions repeated Justice Story's error. See, e.g., Oliver
v. Pialt, 44 U.S. 333, 401 (1845). The writers overlooked the fact, however, that for the de-
fendant to become a plaintiff in trover or detinue he would have to sue in the name of the
broker, who retained legal title. The defendant could have sued the assignees in his own
name only in the equity courts. The tracing language of the opinion only rebutted the assign-
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assets was a fictional extension of the beneficiary's fluid equitable owner-
ship interest in the trust res: the beneficiary's interest in the trust res
survived through changes in the form of the trust property arising from
proper res management. 29 In early tracing cases, the equity courts
merely extended the beneficiary's proprietary interest in the trust res to
ees' argument that the broker's abuse of his authority terminated the defendant's beneficial
interest; the language did not assert tracing to be an at-law remedy. Rather, the passage
describing the right to trace as preserving the defendant's beneficial interest merely restated
equity-court law applicable to disobedient trustees. Thus, the opinion does not define a right
to trace at common law. Ste general'y Khurshid & Matthews, supra at 79-82 (1979). Even
those who find a common law right to trace in the case law would not support a plaintiff's
claim in a case like Taylor . Plumer for the return of the property in specie-the traditional
form of tracing in equity; rather, they would transform the claim into an extension of the
action for money had and received. See R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 1, at 49 (debate
among English writers is often confusing because they conflate two types of exchanges: trans-
fers of misappropriated property from one person to another, such as a trustee in bankruptcy,
and exchanges by one person of misappropriated property for substitute property).
The current vitality of the English controversy over a common law right to trace stems
from the refusal of English courts to trace in equity absent the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant or an intermediary. See In re Diplock, 1 Ch.
465, 530 (Ch. App. 1948). Accordingly, if English courts could be persuaded to recognize a
common law right to trace, it would be broader than the equitable right because the plaintiff
would not need to show that the defendant, or any involved third party, is a fiduciary. R.
GOFi" & G. JONES, supra note 1, at 53.
For years American courts could afford to be lax on the matter because they do not
require a fiduciary relationship for tracing relief in equity. See supra notes 12-16 and accom-
panying text. Thus, in Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 137 (1877) the court could avoid the
issue of whether there is a common law right to trace when faced with a nonfiduciary
misappropriation:
It is not necessary to decide that, in the case supposed, [the victim of the theft]
would have the legal title to the [product of the stolen goods], but if that
question was involved in the case I should have great hesitation in denying
the proposition. That she could assert an equitable claim to the money, I
have no doubt.
The courts may soon have to face the problem directly, however, now that the Supreme
Court has arguably concluded the constitutional right to a jury trial depends on the character
of the remedy. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
A theoretical problem with common law tracing that has not been carefully considered
concerns the role of the bona fide purchaser. Equitable tracing does not affect bona fide
purchasers because their purchase cuts off equitable rights in the subject property. Tracing at
law, however, would rest on notions of legal title, and bona fide purchasers are subject to legal
title claims. Cf 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1060-61
(1965) (discussing remedies in breached cash sales as legal title controversies). Therefore, if
tracing were permitted at law, bona fide purchasers theoretically may be subject to extensive
tracing claims that they have heretofore avoided. Courts are not likely to go along, however.
See, e.g., Cole v. Bates, 186 Mass. 584, 72 N.E. 333 (1904).
29 Known originally as an "active use," this type of trust, in which the feofee (the recipi-
ent of a grant of land in fee simple) had positive duties to perform at the direction of the
feoffor (the transferor of legal title), survived the Statute of Uses in 1536. Common provisions
in these early active uses included those directing the feoffees to raise money out of the trans-
ferred land for the payment of debts, for marriage portions, and for religious or other charita-
ble contributions to aid the donor's soul. See S. MILsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 233-36 (2d ed. 1981). A good early discussion of the nature of the beneficiary's
interest in the trust res is contained in Lord Justice Turner's opinion in Pennell v. Deffell, 4
De G. M. & G. 372, 372-89, 43 Eng. Rep. 551, 551-59 (1853).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:172
include unauthorized changes in form. The Chancellors refused to crystal-
lize the beneficiary's interest in the trust res upon the occurrence of the
wrongful misappropriation by the trustee. Thus, the courts allowed a
beneficiary to elect to affirm the illegal acts and "trace" his property
through wrongful exchanges. 30 Alternatively stated, at the plaintiffs
election a court would presume conclusively that the errant trustee had
acted with proper authority when the exchange was made. This simple
fiction of regularity was the seed of all current tracing doctrine.31
30 Jessel, M.R., explained the argument in 1879:
The modern doctrine of Equity as regards property disposed of by persons in
a fiduciary position is a very clear and well-established doctrine. You can, if
the sale was rightful, take the proceeds of the sale, if you can identify them. If
the sale was wrongful, you can still take the proceeds of the sale, in a sense
adopting the sale for the purpose of taking the proceeds, if you can identify
them. There is no distinction, therefore, between a rightful and a wrongful
disposition of the property, so far as regards the right of the beneficial owner
to follow the proceeds.
In re Hallet's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696, 708-09 (1879).
31 The very early Chancery cases dealing with tracing suggest an intermediate step in its
evolution. In Whitecomb v. Jacob, 1 Salk. 160, 91 Eng. Rep. 149 (1710) and Lane v.
Dighton, 1 Amb. 409, 27 Eng. Rep. 273 (1762), early cases on constructive trusts, the
fiduciaries intended to subject the newly acquired asset to the trust obligation but failed to do
so. See also Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sen. 348, 363, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1083 (1749-50). Thus,
these early tracing cases arguably created an equitable interest in the beneficiary only under
limited conditions. First, the trustee sold the trust res with the intention of subjecting the sale
proceeds to the beneficiary's interest. Second, the retransfer of those proceeds to the benefici-
ary's account was frustrated because of a failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds (as in
Lane) or a lack of effective delivery (as in Whitecomb). See Khurshid & Matthews, supra note
28, at 79-80.
The case of Halcott v. Markan, Prec. Ch. 168, 24 Eng. Rep. 81 (1701), provides the
clearest support for this limited view of tracing. In Halcolt, an executor was empowered by
will to use estate assets to purchase land for an heir. The executor purchased land in his own
name after obtaining the consent of the heir's mother. No trust documents were ever signed
declaring the heir to be the beneficiary, however, and the executor died insolvent. The heir
sought the land and the Master of the Rolls "was very inclinable to help the plaintiff as far as
might be." Id at 169, 24 Eng. Rep. at 81. The Court, therefore, distinguished Kirk v. Webb,
Prec. Ch. 85, 24 Eng. Rep. 41 (1698), see supra note 10, "for there the party did not know
himself to be a trustee," but nonetheless refused to hold for the heir on other grounds (there
was "no express proof of the application of the trust money"). Prec. Ch. at 169, 24 Eng. Rep.
at 81.
As late as 1813, a respected barrister was arguing yet another limitation based on the
intent of the beneftia,, although he recognized that at least one case was not in accord with
his views:
It might perhaps be contended, too, that according to the doctrine-that
where a purchase is made in the name of one person, and the purchase money
belongs to another, that there a trust arises by implication of law in favor of the
person to whom the money belonged; I say it might perhaps, be contended,
that according to this doctrine, the parties would be entitled to the estate
itself. But the doctrine just noticed only applies, I apprehend, to cases where
the parties to whom the money belonged intended it to be laid out either in the
specific purchase, or, generally, in some purchase. Upon the whole I should
be inclined to think, that the parties entitled to the trust money not intended to
be laid out in lands, would only be entitled to a lien on the estate.
E. ATHERLEY, A PRACTIcAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER FAMILY
SETTLEMENTS 444 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (1813). Justice Story, in his
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Once created, however, the doctrine crept inexorably into disorder-
liness.32 Courts extended the equitable ownership concept to ever-
widening classes of cases, peaking with the "swollen asset" rule found in
a few of the bank failure cases of the 1930s.3 3 At about the same time,
influential treatise on equity, found "much sound sense in the distinction," but agreed that
the authorities did not support it. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 13, § 1210, at 457 n.1.
32 See J. DAWSON, supra note 10, at 149-50.
33 The high-water mark of tracing came in the early 1930's when depositors in numer-
ous bank failures found their accounts empty and were unable to trace their funds into any
identifiable fund or property of the insolvent bank. The depositors were left to squabble
among each other and with the bank's other creditors for a share of the remaining assets.
Courts in a few states, moved by the plight of some of the victims, recognized a "swollen
asset" or "augmentation" theory of tracing that gave these select depositors priority over
other kinds of creditors. See, e.g., Word v. Sparks, 191 Ark. 893, 82 S.W.2d 5 (1935); Rackley
v. Mathews, 141 Fla. 307, 193 So. 69 (1940); Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank, 175 Minn. 336,
221 N.W. 236 (1928); Nelson v. Estate of McClean, 236 Mo. App. 718, 161 S.W.2d 676
(1942); First Trust Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N.W. 569 (1934). Numerous
writers supported the movement. See, e.g., Hirsch, Tracing Trat Funds--Modern Doctrine, I I
TEMP. L.Q. 11 (1936); see also Taft, A Defense of a Limited Use of the Swollen Assets Theor, Where
Money Has Wrongfully Been Mingled With Other Mony, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 172, 174 (1939);
Note, Presumptions in Aid of The Cestuiofa Moneg Trust After the Trstee's Insolveny, 26 COLUM. L.
REV. 730 (1926); Note,Pfrority in the Assets ofa Bankrupt Fiduciag or Converter, 51 HARV. L. REV.
143 (1937); Note, TrIsts-Tracing of Assets-Preference, 30 MICH. L. REv. 441 (1932). Under
this new theory, if the plaintiff could prove some equitable wrong by the bank against him, he
was excused from specifically tracing his lost funds into products of exchanges or into com-
mingled funds. The mere fact that the bank wrongfully dealt with plaintiff's assets entitled
him to an equitable lien on the bank's entire estate for the full amount of his loss. This lien
gave the plaintiff priority over other general creditors. Thus, if the bank were a fiduciary
and the beneficiary could argue that the bank breached its duties, he could claim an equita-
ble lien on any asset in the hands of the insolvency trustee. Similarly, if a depositor could
prove that the bank either wrongfully commingled his assets with those of other depositors, or
fraudulently received a deposit while knowing that bankruptcy was imminent, he could claim
an equitable lien for his loss.
The swollen assets theory has far-reaching implications. It completely rids tracing of its
property heritage by eliminating equitable ownership of identifiable property as the basis of
relief. In addition, the theory, if applicable beyond bank failures, grants victims of equitable
wrongs priority over all other creditors in a wide variety of circumstances. For example, if
Wrongdoer steals Owner's money and dissipates it by buying necessities, Owner can claim not
only damages for his loss, but also an equitable lien on any of Wrongdoer's assets to secure
that loss. Accordingly, Owner has a claim on Wrongdoer's assets superior to that of other
general, and possibly other secured, creditors. Why should this be so? If Wrongdoer had not
used Owner's money, the argument goes, Wrongdoer would have used his own, depleting his
funds subject to claims by his other creditors. Perhaps one could argue further that, if at the
same time Wrongdoer used Owner's money on the necessities, Wrongdoer also used an
equivalent amount of his own money to buy property that later appreciated, Owner should
be able to claim that appreciated property; Wrongdoer's use of Owner's money on necessities
enabled him to profit by investing his own money.
Most courts, in accord with Restatement of Restitution, now reject the swollen assets
theory on the ground that the money wrongfully taken does not augment the wrongdoer's
assets that are available to the general creditors. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 215
(1937); G. BOcGERT, supra note 11, § 922 at 374-78; 1G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.14 ("At the
time that the wrongdoer's assets were swelled by the claimant's funds, he incurred a liability
to the claimant in an equal amount."). This rebuttal is largely unsatisfactory. Although the
wrongdoer's estate is subject to the victim's claim for the wrongfully appropriated funds, the
victim, if not granted a priority in distribution, will have his claim diluted by the equivalent
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American legal theorists, recognizing perhaps that tracing was in need
of a sound policy foundation, subsumed the doctrine under the rubric of
"unjust enrichment," and defended tracing on the ground that it re-
quires defendants to disgorge benefits unjustly obtained at the plaintiff's
expense. Tracing is largely so justified today. Even as thus rationalized,
the law of tracing is subject to serious deficiencies. The principle of un-
just enrichment cannot be defensibly invoked to justify most of the nu-
merous applications of tracing.
Courts that employ tracing solely as a method of redressing in-
stances of unjust enrichment are in essence using it as a crude rule of
thumb for calculating the extent of a defendant's gain from a wrongful
appropriation. So employed, tracing becomes a complicated facade for
a rough doctrine of causation. In essence, when a claimant traces prop-
erty into its product in the hands of the defendant, courts conclusively
assume: (a) that the defendant has benefited at the claimant's expense;
and (b) that the amount of the benefit is the value of the traceable prod-
uct. In contrast, courts assume that a claimant who cannot trace is un-
able to demonstrate that a wrongdoer has benefited beyond receiving
the value of the misappropriation. Courts measure this value at the
time of the misappropriation or at the time of the wrongdoer's subse-
quent exchange of the subject property. The simple statement of the
assumptions ought to invite skepticism. Indeed, as is discussed in section
claims of other creditors. Thus, the victim does not receive full compensation, and his loss
augments the defendant's estate to the benefit of the other creditors. For example, Wrong-
doer, who has $100 in assets, owes $100 each to two general creditors, Creditor-One and
Creditor-Two, and wishes to pay Creditor-One in full. In CasedA, Wrongdoer gives Creditor-
One his $100 asset and Creditor-Two is left with nothing upon which to execute. In Case B,
Wrongdoer steals $100 from Owner and gives it to Creditor-One. Wrongdoer's estate is left
with only the original $100 asset. If Owner is not granted a priority in Wrongdoer's estate,
Creditor-Two can collect $50 and Owner can collect $50. Thus, Wrongdoer's estate in Case B
is "swollen" from Creditor-Two's point of view, and he has gained as a result of the theft at
Owner's expense.
The swollen-assets theory may currently survive in a limited class of cases, those in which
a broker misappropriates a customer's securities. Two early Supreme Court cases established
this exception. Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U.S. 19 (1913); Duel v. Hollins, 241 U.S. 523
(1916). The Restatement incorporates the exception: "Where a broker wrongfully disposes of
the securities of a customer, the customer is entitled to claim in substitution therefor securities
of the same issue owned by the broker." RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 215b (1936); see
also Oppenheimer, Rights and Obligations of Customers in Stockbroker Bankruptcies, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 860, 874 (1924). Thus, if a broker wrongfully sells the securities of a customer, and the
proceeds of the sale cannot be traced, the customer can claim specifically other securities of
the same issue from the broker's personal account. Customers therefore who can find match-
ing securities in a broker's personal account acquired any time after the wrongful misappro-
priation can secure a preference in insolvency without specific tracing of the misappropriated
securities. The preference, of course, is at the expense of the other creditors. Although the
rule appears to be a particular version of the otherwise expressly rejected swollen-assets the-
ory, the Restatement of Restitution falls to explain why the general creditors of securities
brokers should be worse off than the general creditors of bankers vit h vir victims of fiduciary
breaches.
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III, they consistently overcalculate the extent of the defendant's benefit
in cases in which the courts allow tracing; and as is discussed in sectons
IV through VII, they create distinctions among both claimants and de-
fendants that do not correspond to the facts of the cases. These systemic
errors cannot be explained as pragmatic short-cuts necessary for work-
able judicial administration of the unjust enrichment principle; more
accurate and yet equally practical rules are possible.
Tracing has attracted its share of critics. In the last fifty years there
has been an intermittent but persistent flow of writing aimed at control-
ling the reaches of tracing doctrine. Nonetheless, the movement does
not offer a sufficient reanalysis; its members appear willing to accept the
basic tracing assumptions if selectively modified. Beginning with a stu-
dent Comment in the Yale Law Journal in 1925,34 commentators began
to question the use of tracing principles in select cases in which a tradi-
tional application of the doctrine led to inequitable results. The Yale
Comment, for example, argued that courts should not use tracing to
penalize the beneficiaries of life insurance proceeds for the wrongs of the
deceased.3 5 Because this comment typifies most modern arguments to
'limit tracing relief, it merits closer inspection.
Assume that a trustee wrongfully takes trust funds and invests them
directly in a life insurance policy payable to his children. The trustee
dies early and the policy pays proceeds well in excess of the invested
premiums. Traditional tracing permits the trust beneficiary to argue
that because he is the equitable owner of the premiums and, through
tracing, the equitable owner of the proceeds, he may claim the entire
proceeds, to the exclusion of the children. The beneficiary thus makes a
tidy profit-perhaps even well in excess of what he would have received
otherwise as a return on his funds-and the children retain nothing.3 6
Most modern commentators agree with the Yale Comment that the
beneficiary should recover from the proceeds only his actual loss, leaving
any excess for the policy's beneficiaries. 37 Here the choice is not be-
34 Comment, Rights of a Dependent Benefciagy Under Insurance Policies Procured With Misap-
propriated Funds, 35 YALE L.J. 220 (1925). The beginning of the movement might also be
Professor Ames's article in 1906, in which he distinguished on moral grounds the innocent
and willful converter. See generally infra note 159. In the case of life insurance, however, Pro-
fessor Ames followed the traditional rule. See Ames, supra note 1, at 511.
35 Comment, supra note 34, at 221. But see Note, Following Misappropriated Funds Into Lfe
Insurance Policies, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 239 (1930).
36 As recently as 1967, a court has used tracing woodenly to reach such a result. See
Baxter House, Inc. v. Rosen, 27 A.D.2d 258, 278 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1967).
37 See, e.g., I G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.15(b), at 190-91. The Yale Comment set forth
the argument as follows:
The defrauded person's recovery of the increased value of the trust res in
cases of constructive trusts has been aptly termed a "windfall", and in the case
of ordinary investment of trust property there seems to be no reason why he
should not get it in the absence of a better claim. But since in life insurance,
the increase over the misappropriated funds invested as premiums would go
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tween an innocent beneficiary and an errant trustee but between two
classes of innocent parties. Accordingly, tracing as an equitable remedy
should be modified as justice requires.38
This argument on the equities can be expanded easily to cases in
which unlimited tracing would allow a plaintiff to claim against inno-
cent third parties who hold traceable property.39 Corollaries of the ba-
sic argument extend to still other types of cases, such as those involving
the rights of creditors of the defendant. For example, suppose that a
trustee wrongfully exchanges the trust res, Blackacre, for personal title
to Whiteacre. Later, he mortgages Whiteacre to a third party and
squanders the mortgage proceeds. The trustee has no assets other than
Whiteacre. The beneficiary prevails by invoking tracing doctrine to
claim Whiteacre free of the third party's mortgage interest, arguing that
the third party is a constructive trustee. Courts, through tracing, give
the beneficiary an implied ownership interest in Whiteacre, and a mort-
gage is subject to superior ownership interests held by those who have
not consented to the mortgage. If the beneficiary could claim only a
money judgment for the value of Blackacre, his claim would be inferior
to that of the third party's; the beneficiary would only have a claim for
to a person who gives nothing in return for it, it is suggested that his claim has
not as great equitable strength as that of the dependent beneficiary. More-
over, in many cases the investment of part of the stolen money in insurance
lulls the dependents into a feeling of security, and prevents them from taking
out other insurance in some legitimate way. At any rate, to give this "wind-
fall" to the defrauded person without giving adequate consideration to the
functional aspects of life insurance is to fail to evaluate the situation properly.
Comment, supra note 34, at 227 (citations omitted).
38 See, e.g., 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.14(c), at 183 ("mhis proprietary interest is
created by equity and should be adapted so as to achieve equity.").
39 The Restatement of Restitution limits tracing relief against "innocent converters"
and "gratuitous transferees." See RESTATEMENT OF RrsTrruTioN §§ 203, 204 (1936). These
rules are among the most difficult to follow in the Restatement. "Innocent converters" are
individuals who unknowingly receive the equivalent of stolen property-property without
title. Assume that an innocent converter exchanges the property for substitute property
before receiving notice that he has no title to the original property. The owner of the con-
verted property may then elect to sue for an equitable lien on the substitute property equal to
the value of the converted property at the time of the conversion or at the time of its exchange
by the innocent converter, unless the converter's skill has increased the value. Id § 203.
"Gratuitous transferees," on the other hand, are individuals who receive legal title to property
subject to unknown equitable claims without paying value, as in the case of property ob-
tained by the fraud of the donor. If a gratuitous transferee exchanges the property for substi-
tute property before notice of the wrong, when sued by the wronged owner he may either
surrender the substitute property, or submit to an equitable lien on the substitute property
equal to the value of the property he originally received. Id § 204. Several questions arise.
Why, a]ter the exchange has been made, are the gratuitous transferees treated differently from
innocent converters? At that time, both hold legal title to the substitute property subject to
equitable claims. Moreover, why do both provisions seem to distinguish between an increase
in value of the traceable property and "profit" resulting from the defendant's skill in ob-
taining an advantage on resale? See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrutON § 154 comment a; id
§ 204 comment d (1936). The decision to hold the property may involve as much skill in
assessing the market as the decision to sell or exchange.
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the residue of the proceeds, if any, after the third party's mortgage inter-
est had been satisfied. Thus, the beneficiary's tracing right in effect ac-
cords him an ownership interest that vests him with priority over the
mortgage holder. In the abstract, some find this result to be fair; the
beneficiary should prevail because he was an innocent victim of the
trustee's misappropriation and the third party mortgagee could have
protected himself with reasonable inquiries and insurance. Indeed, it
may be said that the third party contractually assumed the risk of the
trustee's defective title. There is disagreement on this point, however.
One court recently refused to use tracing to allow a tort victim pri-
ority over the wrongdoer's secured creditors. The Colorado Court of
Appeals, in an unusual decision, Department of Natural Resources v. Benja-
min, 40 refused to grant a claimant tracing relief when it would have dis-
advantaged secured creditors. Mr. Benjamin, a sporting-goods store
owner, embezzled the proceeds of game- and fishing-license sales, using
the proceeds to pay personal and business expenses and to purchase in-
ventory. On a tracing theory, the state seized the inventory in prejudg-
ment proceedings, and a bank, holding a security interest in the
inventory, intervened. The trial court accorded priority to the bank's
claim. The court of appeals affirmed on alternative grounds, one of
which dealt with the theory of tracing relief:
Finally, the [state] misinterprets the theory of imposing a con-
structive trust, or equitable lien, on property wrongfully taken as be-
ing a right to which it is entitled regardless of the relationship of the
other parties in the case. A court may impose a constructive trust
where its only effect is to return property to a plaintiff but may deny it
on the same basic facts where its effect would be to work an unwar-
ranted preference over general creditors. . . . In the present case, the
imposition of a constructive trust is especially inappropriate because
the bank is not merely a general creditor, but holds a perfected secur-
ity interest in the property claimed.41
Even if one belives that tracing should be used to prefer the claims
of innocent victims over the claims of secured creditors or mortgagees
against a wrongdoer's assets, one finds the equities in favor of tracing
relief strained when Whiteacre is significantly more valuable than
Blackacre. Should the beneficiary take all, at a significant personal
profit, while the third party mortgagee takes nothing? Suppose that
Whiteacre is now valuable enough both to satisfy completely the third
party's mortgagee interest and to make the beneficiary whole by restor-
ing the lost value of Blackacre. Traditional enthusiasts of tracing would
rely on a simple deduction from the "necessities" of equitable owner-
40 41 Colo. App. 520, 587 P.2d 1207 (1978).
41 Id at 532, 587 P.2d at 1209 (citation omitted).
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ship, and hold that the beneficiary takes all.4 2 Modern commentators,
however, would limit the beneficiary's recovery to his actual loss. 43 The
conflict, again, is not between an errant trustee and an innocent benefi-
ciary, but between two innocent parties. Here, to the extent that the
beneficiary receives more than the lost value of Blackacre, the beneficiar
profits at the third party mortgagee's expense, not at the expense of the
trustee. Therefore, the revisionists conclude, the beneficiary should re-
cover appreciated assets in specie only if there are no other innocent par-
ties with a claim to the property.
Another class of controversial cases involves those in which tracing
enables a claimant to reach assets exempt from general creditors. 4 4 Tra-
ditionalists would allow the victim to claim all traceable property in spe-
cie even when it is otherwise exempt from claimants.45 The revisionists,
on the other hand, would at minimum limit tracing to an equitable lien
on the exempt assets for the amount of the victim's actual loss. 46
Observe that in all the foregoing cases but Benjamin, the revisionists
still favor the use of the principle of equitable ownership to define the
core of tracing doctrine. For example, in the life insurance case modern
commentators agree that the beneficiary should have some claim on the
life insurance proceeds; they focus on how to measure that claim. But
the fact that the beneficiary has any claim on the proceeds in specie is a
product of the direct-exchange rule that originated in trustee-miscon-
42 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comments e, f (1936).
43 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.14(c) ("[I]t is significant that almost as a matter of
course the decree in favor of the claimant against an insolvent estate goes no further than to
impress a lien on the traced asset."). See D. DOBBS, Supra note 1, at 244-45; see also Republic
Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935); In re J.M. Acheson Co., 170 F.
427 (9th Cir. 1909); Smith v. Township of Au Gres, 150 F. 257 (6th Cir. 1906).
44 All states, by constitution or by statute, restrict creditor recourse to certain property.
These statutes are designed to protect the debtor from himself, shelter the debtor's family
from the debtor's excesses, and minimize society's burden of providing for the debtor and his
family by preserving his opportunity for self-support. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289-91 (1950).
The laws are old and varied. Most states exempt a small amount of personal property
(by value or by type), life insurance proceeds, some amount of wages, and an interest in the
family income. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 3; TENN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 11 (1977); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 427.010(1) (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 5206 (McKinney 1978 & Supp.
1983); VA. CODE §§ 34-4 to 34-31 (Supp. 1982). The protection is not absolute. A federal tax
lien may be satisfied from some exempt property. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6334 (1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 427.010(3)(c) (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5719.08 (Page 1980). Many states also carve exceptions for state taxes,
alimony, and child-support obligations. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATS. § 52-352b(h) (1981)
(child support); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4910 (1974) (state taxes); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAA §
5205(d) (3) (McKinney 1978) (alimony). Most states allow mortgages and security interests to
be foreclosed despite the exempt-property statutes. Eg., KY. REV. STAT. § 427.060 (1979);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
45 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comment k (1936); 5 A. ScOrr, supra note
1, § 508.3.
46 See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, § 2.15, at 187.
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duct cases.47 Thus, although modern commentators often scorn equita-
ble ownership as a controlling theory in tracing cases, they do not
ultimately repudiate the concept. Instead, they invoke considerations of
fairness to readjust the results where obvious inequities arise. But if I
am right, a more radical course is appropriate.
Even if courts adopt the position of modern commentators and re-
vise tracing doctrine in select cases to adjust for the inequities that rigid
application of the equitable ownership concept produces, the doctrine
will continue to be fundamentally defective. Tracing doctrine applied
in this form overcalculates the extent of the defendant's benefit and cre-
ates arbitrary distinctions among claimants and among defendants, dis-
tinctions that do not correspond to the actual facts of the cases. These
defects are the subject of the succeeding sections.
III
TRACING AND MEASUREMENT OF THE DEFENDANT'S
BENEFIT
Courts have had great difficulty in applying tracing doctrine when
a defendant demands: (a) reimbursement of the value of personal time,
money, or property that he contributed in maintaining, improving or
creating the traceable property; and (b) apportionment of any gain cre-
ated by his expenditures in combination with the traceable property.
Courts make conflicting responses to these contentions.48 For example,
47 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
48 Courts facing reimbursement and apportionment questions in tracing looked initially
for guidance to the rules developed in the context of breached trusts. In dealing with disobe-
dient trustees holding trust res for their own account, the courts hold that the trustee is enti-
tled to reimbursement for expenditures incurred on the misappropriated property only if he
clearly would have made similar expenditures out of the trust res had he acted properly and
on behalf of the beneficiary. Presumably, if a trustee, while wrongfully pursuing his own
interests, decides that expenditures are necessary, he would have made the same decision had
he continued to manage the property for the beneficiary. Because repairs and payment of
encumbrances are routine necessities in conscientious trust administration, but improvements
are not, courts usually give credit for the former, but not the latter. Compare Tegtmeyer v.
Tegtmeyer, 314 Ill. App. 16, 40 N.E.2d 767 (1942) (guarantor in action for accounting of
proceeds from sale of trust property entitled to credits for taxes and special assessments paid
to obtain guaranty policy for property) and Hawley v. Tesch, 88 Wis. 213, 59 N.W. 670 (1894)
(fraudulent purchaser of trust property credited with amounts paid for taxes, commissions to
agents, and costs of title abstracts) with Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105
(1963) (trustees who violated duties deserve no reimbursement for improvements made upon
property) and Cawthon v. Cochell, 121 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (agent has no right
to repayment for value of improvements to trust property). The size of the credit is the lesser
of the amount actually spent or the increase in value of the property caused by the expendi-
ture. See, e.g., Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60 (1883); see 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at § 291.6.
Even if the trustee receives credit for expenditures, however, he may not claim any portion of
the appreciation caused by those expenditures. Had the trustee acted properly-holding the
property for the trust account and making the expenditures out of trust res-the trust would
have received the benefit of the entire gain. See, e.g., Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 40
N.E.2d 707 (1942); Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60 (1883). Some courts fashioned an important
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if Wrongdoer steals a teapot from Owner-One and exchanges it, plus
$50 cash, for a guitar worth $150, some courts allow Owner-One to
claim, through a constructive trust, a two-third ownership interest in the
guitar.49 On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, if Wrongdoer ex-
pends the equivalent of $50 in time repairing the dents in the teapot so
that he can exchange it without more for the guitar worth $150, some
exception for expenditures of personal time: If an errant trustee spends valuable personal time
augmenting the value of wrongfully taken trust res, he will not receive credit for the value of
his time, even if it was time that he would have expended had he acted properly. Moreover,
the errant trustee must remit any payment received for his services during the period of his
wrongful actions. See generally Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 663-64 (1888). The courts
base the exception on a refusal to pay "salaries to wrongdoers."
If the trustee wrongfully exchanges the trust res for substitute property and incurs ex-
penses in acquiring or maintaining the substitute property, the analysis of the courts in deter-
mining the trustee's rights to reimbursement moves toward the limits of sensible speculation.
Although the exchange is wrongful, courts assume the substitute property to be in the trust-
a fiction of regularity-and continue to ask whether the trustee would have made the expend-
itures on the property had he acted properly. For example, Wrongdoer, trustee of a stock
portfolio, wrongfully exchanges some of the stock for a personal yacht and incurs expenses in
maintaining it. The court will ask whether, assuming the yacht to be in the trust, the trustee
would have incurred such maintenance expenses had he held the yacht on behalf of the bene-
ficiary. Hampering the inquiry, of course, is the difficulty in speculating on circumstances
that are based on the counterfactual assumption that the trust would have contained the
yacht.
Moreover, the nature of the fiction seems to change when the size of the wrongdoer's
personal expenditures is large in comparison with the amount of the trust res wrongfully
appropriated. Wrongdoer, a trustee of a stock portfolio, wrongfully exchanges $100 worth of
the trust stock and $100 of his own funds for a $200 mink coat that appreciates in value to
$240. The beneficiary's equitable interest in the coat is routinely limited to one-half of its
value, $120. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 210(2) & comment d (1936). In deter-
mining whether to grant a credit for the $100 personal expenditure, courts do not ask whether
the trustee, assuming that the exchange of stock for the coat was proper, would have (or
should have) withdrawn the full $200 from trust assets to buy the coat. Rather, courts assume
that the beneficiary and the trustee have ajoint interest in the property; the beneficiary main-
tains an equitable interest in one-half of the coat, and the trustee has a personal legal interest
in the other one-half. The fiction, therefore, shifts from one artificial assumption in expense
cases, that the trustee was properly managing the res when he made the exchange-to an-
other in the joint-fund cases, that the trustee and the beneficiary have agreed to a partnership
of sorts in the newly acquired property. The shift has significant results for the errant trustee:
In the former case he may receive his personal expenditures; in the latter case he is entitled to
not only his expenditures, but also to a portion of the profit attributable to those expendi-
tures. Although the courts have not analyzed the line of demarcation, apparently the shift
turns on the magnitude of the trustee's personal expenditure. The larger the expenditure in
relation to the value of the misappropriated trust res, the more likely that courts will consider
the trustee a joint owner of the traced property.
With the extension of the constructive trust and tracing remedies to all cases involving
fiduciary breaches, the rules from the trust cases can no longer be sensibly applied. In cases of
fiduciary conversion in which the defendant has no legitimate management responsibilties (he
is a simple bailee, for example), it is pure folly to ask the court to speculate on whether the
defendant would have made the expenditures if he had possessed management responsibilities
over the traceable property and was carrying them out reasonably. The artificial fictions are
nonsensical and the courts must focus simply on the core notion of what are reasonable results
under the circumstances. Cohesive guidelines have yet to emerge in the case law.
49 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1939).
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courts allow Owner-One to claim the guitar.50 Less clear is whether
Owner-One may claim the guitar without paying Wrongdoer $50, if
Wrongdoer has payed $50 to a dent-repair specialist before he ex-
changes the teapot for the guitar.5 1 In all three cases, Wrongdoer's
financial position is essentially identical: He has parted with a $100
teapot and $50-or its equivalent in personal time-in exchange for a
guitar worth $150.
The disparity of treatment in each of the three foregoing kinds of
cases increases if Wrongdoer realizes a profit. If the guitar is worth
$200, and Owner-One makes no claim, Wrongdoer has a $50 profit in
each case. Yet Owner-One's claim varies from case to case: in the first
case, Owner-One can claim two-thirds of a guitar worth $200, a value of
$133; in the second case, Owner-One receives an undivided interest in
the guitar, a value worth $200; and in the third case, Wrongdoer re-
ceives a credit of $50, and Owner-One receives $150 in value. Thus, in
the first case the profit is apportioned and Wrongdoer receives a $17
profit in addition to a credit for his $50 contribution to the price of the
guitar. In the second case, Wrongdoer is penalized to the extent of the
value of his personal services and denied any part of the profit, even
though he risked the value of his time. In the third case, Wrongdoer
may be reimbursed for his expenses, but probably will not receive any of
the profit even though he has risked his $50.
The distinctions created by courts in this area are a product of the
historical legacy of tracing that attaches consequences based on physical
rather than causal events. Moreover, the distinctions may also be influ-
enced by latent factual assumptions: for example, paying Wrongdoer a
salary for repairing dents in a teapot which he stole is apparently harder
to stomach than crediting him for paying to have the dents repaired
because it is likely, perhaps, that the Wrongdoer would not have re-
50 See, e.g., Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617, 663-64 (1888); cf. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen
Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946), discussed in Oesterle, supra note 9, at 354. But see
Brooks v. Conston, 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950).
51 The Restatement and Professor Scott would distinguish between ignorant and con-
scious wrongdoers. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 158 (1936); 5 A. ScoTr, supra note
1, § 4791.1. A conscious wrongdoer can be reimbursed for the discharge of liens, the payment
of taxes, and necessary repairs or maintenance, unless it would work a "hardship" on the
victim. He cannot obtain reimbursement for unnecessary repairs, improvements, or addi-
tions. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrTUTION § 158 (1936). Ignorant wrongdoers are entitled to
all expenditures for repairs, even those that exceed their reasonable value, unless it would
work a hardship for the victim; the victim's argument, that he would have not incurred the
expenses himself had there been no wrongful taking, is unsuccessful. No case law appears to
either explicitly follow the distinction or explicitly reject it; the issue seems to have escaped
serious judicial consideration. Moreover, neither the Restatement nor Professor Scott makes
clear whether a disobedient trustee can ever be "innocent," and thus benefit from the rule, or
whether the rule is restricted to third parties acting without knowledge of the trustee's breach.
In another context, however, the Restatement equates all fiduciaries who are guilty of breaches
of trust with conscious wrongdoers. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 202 (1936); id
comments a, b.
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ceived $50 for his services had he not stolen the teapot. He surely could
have used elsewhere the $50 that he spent on the dent specialists.
Whatever the cause, at present the courts' explanations of the distinc-
tions seem remarkably unsophisticated. Indeed, the distinctions mask a
far more significant problem; deficiencies in the definition of benefit
that is an integral part of the concept of unjust enrichment.
A. Benefit Received as Saved Cost: General Rule and Exceptions
Assume that Wrongdoer, with ten dollars in his pocket, steals ten
dollars from Owner. Wrongdoer then deposits his ten dollars in an in-
terest-bearing bank account and exchanges Owner's ten dollars for a
hat. At the time Owner gets a judgment against Wrongdor, the bank
account has produced one dollar of interest and the hat is worth fifteen
dollars. Owner traces into the hat and realizes a profit of five dollars
from his stolen money. Tracing conclusively presumes that Wrong-
doer's benefit from the conversion is the traceable product-the hat.
Wrongdoer argues that his real benefit from the conversion is not fifteen
dollars but eleven dollars, for had he not stolen Owner's money, Wrong-
doer would have purchased the hat with his ten dollars and foregone the
one dollar of interest. His profit from the conversion, Wrongdoer con-
tends, was the money stolen, plus the one dollar of interest that he was
able to earn as a result of depositing his own ten dollars with a bank at
market rates of interest. Alternatively, he argues, if he had not used
Owner's ten dollars to buy the hat, he would have borrowed ten dollars
at a certain rate of interest (assume that the interest totaled one dollar)
in order to buy the hat. Therefore, his benefit from stealing Owner's ten
dollars is the debt of ten dollars plus one dollar of interest otherwise
necessary to buy the hat. Again, Wrongdoer asserts that his actual gain
from the conversion is eleven dollars, not the fifteen dollars claimed by
Owner.
Objectively, the wealth that Wrongdoer gained as the result of the
conversion depends on whether he still would have bought the hat had
he not taken Owner's money. If so, then the actual benefits arising from
the misappropriation are measured more accurately by the difference
between Wrongdoer's wealth after the misappropriation and Wrong-
doer's wealth had he purchased the misappropriated property with
available funds or lines of credit. Wrongdoer's actual benefit arising
from the conversion is his ability to forego use of the other available
sources of capital to purchase the hat. The four-dollar gain,52 represent-
ing what Wrongdoer would have realized if he had acted lawfully in
purchasing the hat with his own ten dollars (or with a borrowed ten
52 The dollar gain is the value of the hat ($15), minus the $10 purchase price and the
otherwise-available one dollar of interest on the $10.
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dollars) is not a benefit derived from the conversion; rather, the benefit
is attributable to extraneous factors, such as smart trading, or favorable
market conditions. On the other hand, if Wrongdoer would not have
bought the hat without Owner's money, then he can be said to have the
hat solely as the result of the conversion. Even so, the calculation of
Wrongdoer's benefit is not as simple as tracing implies, as subsection B
will shortly illustrate.
Of course, whether Wrongdoer would have bought the hat had he
not misappropriated Owner's money is a factual inquiry requiring con-
jecture on Wrongdoer's conduct in a context that assumes no intentional
conversion. Tracing cuts off such an inquiry by conclusively presuming
that Wrongdoer would not have acquired the hat absent the conversion.
In cases in which Wrongdoer has available funds or borrowing capacity
that far exceeds the value of the conversion or the traceable property,
however, the presumption is irrational. Why should one assume that
Wrongdoer would take advantage of a "deal"-buying a fifteen dollar
hat for only ten dollars-solely because he had converted ten dollars of
Owner's funds? The more plausible assumption is the reverse: Even
without Owner's ten dollars, Wrongdoer would have taken advantage of
the "deal" by using his own funds or his borrowing capacity.
Tracing, in other words, should be rejected as a measure of benefit
in those cases in which the Wrongdoer's financial condition renders
plausible his claim that he would have bought the traceable asset absent
the misappropriation. A calculation of benefit in such cases should in-
stead consist of the value of the misappropriation at the time of its oc-
currence, plus the interest on that value at the rate available to
Wrongdoer either on other funds or the rate available if he had bor-
rowed a sum equivalent to that value. Documentation of the Wrong-
doer's various exchanges in order to trace into the product of the
misappropriated product would be unnecessary. Rather, the court's in-
quiry would focus on the interest rate that Wrongdoer would have re-
ceived in either depositing or loaning money, or the rate that he would
have been charged in borrowing money.
One significant exception exists, however. Using tracing to meas-
ure a wrongdoer's benefit when his funds or borrowing capacity greatly
exceeds the value of the traceable property appears justifiable in the
case of a disobedient trustee (or a similarly situated fiduciary) who has
the power and responsibility to manage the trust res by changing its
form; ironically, this is the situation from which the tracing doctrine
originally evolved.5 3 When the trustee misappropriates property and
uses it in transactions for his own account, he has misappropriated not
only the property, but also his investment services. Consistent with the
53 Tracing is similarly useful when corporate executives steal and use corporate property
to take corporate opportunities.
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analysis above, the trustee's benefit from the misappropriation of the res
property is the value of the misappropriation and his saved interest.
The trustee's benefit gained through withholding his services from the
trust, however, is the value of those services that he was free to use for
his own account. Therefore, an accurate measure of the value of his
services is arguably their actual product: any appreciation or profit in,
or income from, exchanges of the misappropriated res. Thus tracing
serves as a measure of the combined benefit Wrongdoer acquires from the
misappropriated property and from the withholding of his services. Yet,
as the next subsection illustrates, whenever tracing is used in any con-
text, against a fiduciary or insolvent wrongdoer, we are left with appor-
tionment problems.
B. Credit and Apportionment for Wrongdoer's Contributions
The hard cases arise when the wrongdoer lacks the wealth or bor-
rowing capacity to purchase the traceable property, or when the wrong-
doer has sufficient funds, but the item is so expensive that he would not
have bought it with merely his own funds. In such cases, the wrongdoer
would not have acquired the traceable product of the misappropriated
asset but for the conversion. Thus, the product of the misappropriated
property may be an accurate measure of the wrongdoer's benefit at the
plaintiff's expense; then again, it may not. If Wrongdoer contributes his
own time or money to create or augment the value of the traceable
product, the "but for" test is too simple: Wrongdoer may not have had
the traceable product "but for" the misappropriation, but the traceable
product that Owner claims may not have been so valuable "but for"
Wrongdoer's efforts or contributions subsequent to the conversion. The
issue has two parts: first, whether to credit Wrongdoer with expenses
that he has incurred in the exchange of misappropriated property for
traceable property; and if so, whether to apportion any profits gained
through the exchange to those produced by Wrongdoer's expenditures.
The inquiry is both theoretically and factually complex, and current
tracing doctrine does not provide workable answers in this area.
Some modern writers retreat from the credit and apportionment
problems by arguing that the courts should do whatever is fair under
the circumstances.5 4 Perhaps this is all that can be said. If, however,
one demands more precision, the issue might be resolved as follows, con-
sistent with the definition of benefit noted above (ie., tracing is limited
to cases against select fiduciaries or essentially insolvent defendants).
Conscious wrongdoers in the latter category should receive none of the
gain generated by the misappropriation over and above a credit for
their actual expenditures. Because such defendants could not have ac-
54 See RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION § 158 (1936); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1, at 161.
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quired the gain absent the wrongdoing-they had no substitute source
of cash-they should not receive an apportionment of the profits. They
should, however, receive credit for the actual value of any expenditures
of time and money to the extent that such expenditures augmented the
value of the traceable items. On the other hand, defendants ignorant of
their wrong, but nonetheless legally culpable, should always receive an
apportionment of the profits as well as credit for their expenditures.55
For example, Wrongdoer steals a teapot from Owner worth $100.
Wrongdoer pays $10 dollars to repair the teapot and exchanges the tea-
pot for a guitar worth $200. Wrongdoer has no other assets, either at
the time of the theft or at the time of the exchange. His gain from the
theft is $190. Because without the theft he had no source of capital to
55 The Restatement reflects this distinction by finding that innocent converters and gratui-
tous donees are entitled to profits resulting from their skill in using the traceable property, but
that tortious converters must surrender all profits from the use of the property. RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 202-204 (1936).
Professor Dawson recently argued, in the context of the restitutionary claim for an ac-
counting of profits, that the conscious-unconscious distinction has been justifiably rejected by
American courts. See Dawson, supra note 8, at 619. His observation seems to rest on the fact
that few cases invoke the distinction and that many of the cases involving fiduciary breaches
implicitly reject the distinction. His argument that the distinction itself should be rejected
seems to rest on his view that it "presuppose[s] that this is punishment for moral fault." Id at
617. But see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comment c, § 203 comment a (1936)
(conscious-unconscious rule is shorthand for a distinction between cases in which deterrence is
necessary and those in which it is unnecessary).
Professor Dawson argues that the decision to divest the defendant of profits should rest
first, on an assessment of whether the remedy is necessary to deter the conduct in issue, and
second, on whether the "gain is illegitimate" as the result of "invading immunities of another
to which the legal order had determined to give full-scale protection." Dawson, supra note 8,
at 617. He also seems to place primary importance on the second factor: "[P]olicing. . . is
not the main object of restitution. Accounting for profit will be awarded, if it is, because it
has been shown and to the extent it is shown that the interest invaded contributed to produc-
ing the profit." Id at 620. Dawson offers one caveat to his position, however: "It may be
that where the restitution claim becomes attenuated and the gain must be traced from its
original form into an identified product, the one who was 'unconscious' of any wrongdoing
should not have to account for additional profit through favorable investment." Id. at 619
(footnote omitted). In the caveat, of course, he seems to favor the conscious-unconscious dis-
tinction peculiarly in tracing. His comment is somewhat puzzling. Is the issue a matter of
proof? Are unconscious wrongdoers allowed the benefit of a higher standard of proof on
whether the profits were the result of the wrong? Or is the issue the preservation of the
unconscious wrongdoer's right to benefit from his skills in making the profits?
The conscious-unconscious distinction seems justified because of the sterility of a "but
for" causation test. "But for" the wrong, neither the conscious nor the ignorant wrongdoer
would profit in cases in which tracing may accurately measure benefit. The same can be said
for their personal contributions; neither wrongdoer would profit but for his personal contribu-
tions. We should refuse to apportion the profit in the case of the conscious wrongdoer, but
should allow it in the other case of the ignorant wrongdoer, because of the character of the
wrong. The balance between the policies of encouraging productive use of property and
deterring wrongful conduct is different in the two cases; in the case of the conscious wrong-
doer the latter policy prevails, while in the case of the ignorant wrongdoer the former policy is
stronger. Reckless conduct poses a harder case. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 202
comment a Caveat (1926); id § 203 Caveat (1936).
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buy the guitar (and assuming no sharp trading), his entire gain is a re-
sult of the theft. Therefore, as a conscious wrongdoer, Wrongdoer
should not receive a portion of the profits equal to the percentage of his
legitimate contribution ($10) to the deal. Yet, he should be able to
claim a credit for his $10 expenditure if it increased the value of the
teapot by $10 or more. Refusing to grant the credit would not further
any policy of disgorging Wrongdoer's benefit; refusal would simply pe-
nalize him in the amount of his expenditure and give the penalty to the
plaintiff as a windfall. 56 Because restitution does not purport to penal-
ize, its underlying rationale cannot support a denial of the credit.
Moreover, a penalty in one context is no less a penalty in another.
If, instead of spending ten dollars to fix the dents in the teapot, Wrong-
doer spends ten dollars of time to fix the dents himself, he should be
credited nonetheless. 57 If Wrongdoer's time is worth little, however, he
should receive no credit. Whether Wrongdoer is unjustly benefited by
credit for his time spent in the wrongful exchanges turns on the fair
market value of his services, not on the simplistic notion that wrongdo-
ers should never receive a salary for their illegal acts. 58
The analysis is a bit different in the case of disobedient trustees or
other fiduciaries, in which tracing is justified as a measure of the value of
services withheld from the plaintiff. These wrongdoers should not re-
ceive credit for any expenditures of time that augument the traceable
property beyond the compensation fixed in the fiduciary arrangement.
They should, however, receive credit for expenditures of money or the
like, but need not receive any apportionment of the profits which are
rightfully due the claimant as a result of the pre-existing relationship.
C. If Not Unjust Enrichment, Deterrence?
At this point it is tempting to search for a reason other than the
principle of unjust enrichment to justify traditional tracing relief. An
obvious candidate is deterrence of misappropriations: Tracing relief, al-
though often operating harshly by granting the plaintiff a windfall ex-
ceeding the real gain attributable to the defendant's misappropriation,
is arguably needed to deter wrongdoing. Perhaps a penalty in addition
to the disgorgement of any wrongfully acquired gain would serve as a
stern warning to putative wrongdoers.
The deterrence theory, however, does not wash. First, it is not clear
56 For one case in which this principle led to absurd results, see 319 East 72nd St. Corp.
v. Warnecke & Co., 20 A.D.2d 513, 244 N.Y.S.2d 604 (lst Dep't), afppealdimissed, 13 N.Y.2d
1126, 196 N.E.2d 558, 247 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963) (defendant may not set off the costs of im-
provement or receive credit for any portion of the increased value of a once-barren piece of
land worth $655,000 that defendant improved to the extent that it was worth $3,675,000).
57 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
58 See supra note 48.
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that civil penalties are necessary if criminal penalties also apply. Sec-
ond, it is arguable that the only real deterrence distinct to tracing is a
warning to wrongdoers either to take care to obscure the transactional
trail of misappropriated assets or to dissipate funds that are traceable to
misappropriated items by investing them in food, vacations, and other
perishables. For example, Wrongdoer converts an automobile and ex-
changes it for stock that he still holds. If the stock is equal or lesser in
value than what the victim could recover in a simple money judgment,
then, of course, tracing per se does not provide any additional deter-
rence over that attributable to the damages remedy. On the other hand,
if the stock has significantly appreciated and is greater in value than
what the victim could recover in a money judgment, then tracing, in
forcing the Wrongdoer to disgorge the stock, exacts a greater penalty
and can be said to create added deterrence against conversions. Calcu-
lating wrongdoers, however, could read the remedy as not deterring con-
versions but rather as deterring acts after conversion that support
tracing--direct exchanges of the converted property for other property,
for example. Thus, perhaps, tracing effects how knowledgable wrongdo-
ers use misappropriated property rather than the initial act of conver-
sion itself.
Third, the size of the penalty is limited to events that may have
little or no relationship to the considerations that should affect the im-
position of such a penalty. In the example in the previous paragraph,
the amount of appreciation of the stock determines the size of the pen-
alty exacted. The transactional trail orignating with the misappropri-
ated item may cause the penalty to be relatively large or small. The
trail, however, is independent of the opprobrium associated with the de-
fendant's act and the amount of his net wealth-factors significant in an
assessment of the size of any penalty that deters the unwanted conduct.
In sum, if the creation of a penalty for certain acts is the goal, it makes
little sense to hobble its calculation by the use of the tracing formula.
IV
TRACING'S ARBITRARY DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
CLAIMANTS
Tracing Doctrine also fails to identify satisfactorily who may claim
the defendant's gain from the misappropriation. Consider the following
hypothetical case:
Wrongdoer converts two silver teapots, each valued at $100 and
owned by Owner-One and Owner-Two respectively. Wrongdoer ex-
changes Owner-One's teapot for a guitar and Owner-Two's teapot for
wine, which Wrongdoer consumes. When Wrongdoer is caught,
Owner-One and Owner-Two find that Wrongdoer's only asset is the
guitar, and they both sue Wrongdoer. Because Owner-One can trace
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his teapot into the guitar, he can charge Wrongdoer as a constructive
trustee of the guitar, or enforce an equitable lien on the guitar for
$100. Owner-Two, however, cannot trace his teapot into the guitar,
and thus can receive only a money judgment against Wrongdoer for
$100. Owner-One, if prompt, therefore recovers all of Wrongdoer's
tangible assets, and Owner-Two recovers nothing.
The primacy of a transactional link over a causal link in the law of
tracing grants Owner-One a preferential recovery. Owner-One can re-
construct a line of physical exchanges beginning with his teapot, but
Owner-Two cannot.59 This result is unaltered if Owner-Two can prove
that had Wrongdoer converted only one teapot, he would have ex-
changed it for wine and, therefore, that the conversion of both teapots
was essential to Wrongdoer's exchange of one teapot for a guitar. Simi-
larly, the result is unaltered if Owner-Two proves that Wrongdoer did
not care which teapot was exchanged for the guitar, or even that
Wrongdoer flipped a coin to determine which teapot was so exchanged.
Although Wrongdoer's relationship to Owner-One and Owner-Two is
essentially indistinguishable, Owner-One ends up better off under stan-
dard tracing doctrine than Owner-Two because his teapot happened to
be exchanged for the guitar, a fortuity that occurred after the conver-
sion of both teapots.
In the law of tracing, this historic rule of preference for Owner-One
is based on the assumption that Wrongdoer has the guitar solely because
he misappropriated Owner-One's teapot, and that the guitar represents
his gain wrongfully acquired from this conversion alone. Yet, as the
above hypothetical demonstrates, this assumption may be false. Where
the assumption is false the better result, that Owner-One and Owner-
Two split the value of the guitar, is thwarted by tracing doctrine. More-
over, the demands of judicial convenience do not justify the sacrifice of
Owner-Two's claim. Admittedly, Owner-Two may have difficulty prov-
ing that the conversion of his teapot was essential to the Wrongdoer's
acquisition of the guitar.60 Nonetheless, a case can be made that even
where the facts are unknown, there should be a presumption that the
teapots of both Owner-One and Owner-Two, if stolen within a fixed pe-
59 Similar disparate treatment of Owner-One and Owner-Two occurs when Wrongdoer
is a fiduciary with responsibilities for managing the misappropriated property. Thus, Wrong-
doer takes Owner-One's and Owner-Two's property. He reinvests Owner-One's property at a
profit, but exchanges Owner-Two's property for wine that he consumes, freeing Wrongdoer's
other assets for reinvestment at a profit. Tracing presumes that Wrongdoer profited at the
expense of Owner-One but not at the expense of Owner-Two.
60 The court would need to reconstruct the defendant's reasons for exchanging the tea-
pots for substitute property: Was the acquisition of both teapots necessary to enable him to
acquire the guitar? The evidence would be subjective and the defendant's credibility suspect.
Moreover, the defendant may not have thought about his acts in such a manner at the time
he undertook them. In sum, asking the defendant for a self-analysis of earlier motives may be
an extremely speculative and untrustworthy enterprise.
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riod of the Wrongdoer's acquisition of the guitar, enabled Wrongdoer to
acquire the guitar. If the guitar is worth more than both teapots, Own-
er-One and Owner-Two would enjoy a division of the gain. This pre-
sumption has the advantages over tracing of erring in favor of, rather
than against, Owner-Two on the facts, and of preserving a minimal
claim for Owner-One.
The inequity of treatment between Owner-One and Owner-Two
appears particularly harsh when the guitar at the time of judgment is
worth $150-a sum sufficient to satisfy fully the loss of Owner-One and
still leave $50 for Owner-Two. Prevailing doctrine, however, indicates
that even then Owner-One can claim the guitar in specie. Some argue
that Owner-One should be limited in this case to an equitable lien equal
to his actual loss: Owner-One would collect $100 and Owner-Two
would collect $50.61 Even if this result is accepted, however, the essen-
tial inequity of the previous situation persists, for Owner-Two is left
with a smaller recovery than Owner-One. Moreover, the results allow
Owner-One what is in effect, a secured claim; that is, Owner-One has an
in specie claim on the guitar through constructive trust, while Owner-
Two has only a money judgment.
The lesson of the illustration extends beyond those few cases in
which Wrongdoer is subject to the claims of more than one victim.
Once one recognizes that Owner-One and Owner-Two may not deserve
disparate treatment, one must acknowledge that the inequity is similar
if distinct wrongdoers victimize Owner-One and Owner-Two. Assume
that Wrongdoer-One, with $100 in his pocket, converts Owner-One's
teapot worth $100 and exchanges it for a guitar. Wrongdoer-One ex-
changes the $100 in his pocket for wine, which he consumes. Owner-
One can claim the guitar under tracing doctrine. Wrongdoer-Two, who
also has $100 in his pocket, converts Owner-Two's teapot and exchanges
it for $100 worth of wine, which he consumes. Wrongdoer-Two ex-
changes the $100 that was in his pocket for a guitar. Owner-Two proves
that had Wrongdoer-Two not been able to convert Owner-Two's teapot,
he would have spent the $100 in his pocket on wine. Owner-Two can-
not trace; he may only obtain a personal judgment against Wrongdoer-
Two for $100 and attempt to execute on the guitar-a far less powerful
remedy. Tracing, in contrast, assumes that Wrongdoer-One possesses
the guitar solely because of the conversion of Owner-One's teapot, and
therefore forces Wrongdoer-One to turn the guitar over to Owner-One
as a way of stripping Wrongdoer-One of any benefit from the wrong.
Yet, on the facts above, Owner-One's rights against Wrongdoer-One
logically should be no better than Owner-Two's rights against Wrong-
61 See supra text at notes 34-47.
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doer-Two; both Wrongdoer-One and Wrongdoer-Two have a guitar as
a direct result of their conversions.
The more sensible approach might be to allow Owner-Two to
prove, if possible, that the theft of his teapot enabled Wrongdoer-Two to
free up and use other funds or assets to purchase the guitar. Again,
however, the relevant facts may be very difficult to determine. 62 Still
courts could assume that Wrongdoer-Two has gained at Owner-Two's
expense, if Wrongdoer-Two acquires assets within a fixed period after
the conversion-rather than assume as tracing does, that he has not
gained in any way at Owner-Two's expense. 63 Thus Owner-Two, whose
$100 teapot was converted, could claim Wrongdoer-Two's guitar even if
it is worth over $100,64 simply because Wrongdoer-Two bought it for
$100 soon after the theft; the exchange of the teapot for now-consumed
wine becomes irrelevant. One assumption seems no less arbitrary on the
facts than the other and, again, this presumption has the advantage of
erring in favor of Owner-Two (and conversely, against, rather than for,
Wrongdoer-Two).
The arbitrariness of this disparate treatment extends to all cases in
which Owner-One can trace but Owner-Two cannot. Thus, when
Owner-One can claim appreciated property, exempt property, or a pri-
ority over other creditors, 65 he is unjustly favored over similarly situated
parties who cannot trace. For example, assume that Wrongdoer-One,
with $100 in his pocket, converts Owner-One's $100 teapot and ex-
changes it for a guitar worth $150. He spends the $100 in his pocket on
wine, which he consumes. Owner-One claims the guitar through trac-
ing, making a profit of $50. Wrongdoer-Two, with $100 in his pocket,
converts Owner-Two's $100 teapot. Wrongdoer-Two uses the cash in
his pocket to buy, at a bargain price, a guitar worth $150. He exchanges
Owner-Two's teapot for $100 in wine, which he consumes. Assume
62 See supra note 69.
63 A version of this argument is found in Professor Gilmore's interpretation of U.C.C.
§ 9-306(4)(d)(ii). See G. GILMORE, supra note 28, § 45.9, at 1338-39;see also infra notes 81-83.
Moreover, one could argue that such a presumption is inherent in the court's interpretation of
§ 17(a)(2), (4) [now § 523(a)(2), (4)] of the Bankruptcy Act in In re Transport Clearings-
Midwest, Inc., 16 Bankr. 890 (W.D. Mo. 1979). In that case, a shipper mistakenly paid
money to the bankrupt instead of the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to a
constructive trust on the money even though it could not trace into an identifiable fund in the
bankrupt's estate. The bankruptcy judge held that although the plaintiff had lost its right to
reclamation it was nevertheless entitled to a decree of nondischargeability. Thejudge refused
to leave the plaintiff on an equal footing with general unsecured creditors (whose claims were
discharged), for "[s]uch a result offends the cardinal principle of equality that a person should
not be allowed to benefit by his own wrong." id. at 893. The judge thus rejected the rule in In
re Whitlock, 449 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Mo. 1978) that tracing is necessary to a decree of
nondischargeability because the availability of tracing determines whether the bankrupt has
in fact benefited or gained from the conversion.
64 Of course, if other creditors are in the picture, other policies become important. See
infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
65 See injra text accompanying note 69.
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Owner-Two can prove that Wrongdoer-Two would not have used his
cash to buy the guitar had he not converted Owner-Two's teapot;
Wrongdoer-Two's first priority was to obtain $100 in wine. Nonetheless,
Owner-Two can only obtain a money judgment against Wrongdoer-
Two for $100 and execute on the guitar. Tracing doctrine is premised
on the notion that wrongdoers should be divested of any profit resulting
from the wrong. Nonetheless, it allows only Owner-One to claim the
$50 profit, even though one can reasonably argue that, in the same
sense, a $50 profit resulted from the theft of Owner-Two's teapot. Trac-
ing presumes that Wrongdoer-One's profit is causally linked to the
wrong, but that Wrongdoer-Two's profit is not. Again, such conclusive
presumptions may be contrary to fact.
The discussion thus far has focused on tracing exchange-products of
misappropriated property, but the concerns raised also apply to the
commingled-fund branch of tracing doctrine. Assume for example,
Wrongdoer converts a dollar bill of both Owner-One and Owner-Two.
Wrongdoer commingles Owner-One's dollar with Wrongdoer's other,
indistinguishable dollar bills, but spends Owner-Two's dollar on wine,
which he consumes. Owner-One can claim an equitable ownership in-
terest in one of Wrongdoer's dollar bills, but Owner-Two is only a gen-
eral creditor of Wrongdoer. Tracing doctrine thus holds that
Wrongdoer's creditors should not benefit at the expense of Owner-One,
and therefore in effect grants Owner-One a preference; the doctrine also
conclusively presumes, however, that Wrongdoer's creditors do not ben-
efit at the expense of Owner-Two, and this is true even though Owner-
Two could prove that Wrongdoer would have spent one of his own dol-
lar bills on wine had he not converted Owner-Two's dollar.
Moreover, it is difficult to justify any of the traditional tracing rules
on withdrawals from a commingled fund as accurate calculations of
Wrongdoer's actual benefit (and, therefore, of the benefit to Wrong-
doer's other creditors) at the expense of Owner-One. 66 Each set of rules
66 If the wrongdoer depletes the commingled fund, however, whose items are left? Early
English cases applied a simplifying rule of first in, first out. See, e.g., Pennel v. Deffell, 43 Eng.
Rep. 551 (Ch. 1853); Brosn v. Adams, 4 L.R.-Ch. 764 (Ch. App. 1869). Thus, the rights of
the parties depended on whether the wrongdoer first deposited his own items or those of the
victim into the pool. In 1879, Jessel, M.R., developed the modem view, now known as the
Rule of Jessel's Bag. See In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879). Under this view, the
court presumes that the items withdrawn first are those of the wrongdoer. Thus, if a defend-
ant embezzles $10, adds $10 of his own, and then withdraws $15, the victim may claim the $5
remaining in the fund. What may the victim claim if after the wrongdoer withdraws and
dissipates some of the victim's items, the wrongdoer adds new, legitimately acquired items to
the pool? For example, suppose the defendant above, after withdrawing $15, adds $5 to the
fund. Can the plaintiff now claim specifically the entire $10 fund? Most courts hold that,
absent an actual intent on the part of the wrongdoer to restore the victim's money, the victim
cannot claim any ownership of the newly deposited $5. As a consequence, the plaintiff neces-
sarily is limited to the lowest intermediate balance in the pool between the time that his
money was added and the time of judgment. Se Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co.,
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offers a mechanical solution to the withdrawal problem, a solution that
avoids any inquiry into the actual gain made by Wrongdoer as a result
of his conversion of Owner-One's dollar bill. The doctrine makes no
serious effort to link the formulas with calculations of Wrongdoer's gain
in "average" cases so as to justify them as legitimate approximations.6 7
Furthermore, the rules cannot be justified as resolving all doubts in
favor of the victim, for they often create presumptions that favor the
wrongdoer: for example, in applying the lowest intermediate balance
limitation, later deposits are not regarded as a restitution of the victim's
fund.68
V
THE EFFECT OF TRACING ON CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
When dissimilar claimants seek satisfaction from an insufficient
79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935). A few courts disagree, however, and presume an intent on the
part of the wrongdoer to restore the victim's funds, thereby allowing the victim to claim
specifically the new deposits as well as any items from the original pool. E.g., Church v.
Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501,203 P.2d 547 (1949); Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla. 1126, 125 So. 360
(1929).
Finally, substantial complications arise when the items withdrawn from the mixed fund
are exchanged for identifiable property. For example, if the property acquired with the fund
appreciates in value, may the victim augment his claim by tracing into the appreciated prop-
erty? The wrongdoer embezzles $10, adds $10 of his own, and withdraws $10 which he ex-
changes for $20 in bearer bonds. Is the victim limited to a claim on the $10 remaining in the
fund, or may he claim the $20 bearer bonds? American courts are divided and one can find
at least three distinct theories in the literature. First, following a 1903 English decision, In re
Oatway, 2 Ch. 356 (1903), some courts offer the victim the option of tracing the withdrawals
into the appreciated property or of treating the remainder of the fund as his own. See Repub-
lic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935); General Ass'n of Davidian
Seventh Day Adventists, Inc. v. General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, 410
S.W.2d 256 (rex. Civ. App. 1966). Other courts strictly follow the Rule of Jessel's Bag,
presuming all withdrawals to be the wrongdoer's property until the remaining fund is less
than the victim's loss. Covey v. Cannon, 105 Ark. 550, 159 S.W. 514 (1912). Finally, under
the Restatement of Restitution, which courts largely have not accepted, the victim may only
claim an equitable lien on both the fund and the product of any withdrawals in the amount
of his loss, or a constructive trust for a proportionate share in both the fund and the product
of any withdrawals. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 210, 211 (1936). The proportionate
share is based on a comparison of victim's involuntary contribution to the whole amount of
the fund at the time of the withdrawals.
67 By way of comparison, consider the more workable doctrine of "confusion" developed
in the at-law courts as a remedy for the commingling of indistinguishable goods that can be
reapportioned (grain). Early courts held that in cases of willful confusion, the wrongdoer
forfeits the claim to the entire mass. E.g., Dillingham v. Smith, 30 Me. 370 (1849); Ryder v.
Hathaway, 21 Mass. 298 (1883). Most modem courts will apportion the pool of assets, but
place the burden on the wrongdoer to prove which portion of the pool is his. See, e.g., Troop
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 25 Ill. App. 2d 143, 166 N.E.2d 116 (1960); Sommers v. Kane,
168 Minn. 420, 210 N.W. 287 (1926). Under the modem view, the doctrine offers the plaintiff
an advantage over a simple damages remedy for conversion when the value of the lost goods
has appreciated since the time of the commingling (replevin enables the plaintiff to share in
the appreciation), and when the wrongdoer is insolvent (replevin enables the plaintiff to take
ahead of other creditors).
68 See Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935).
pool of assets, the law usually allocates the assets by establishing priori-
ties among the claimants. Tracing doctrine alters these priorities to the
extent that it grants select claimants ownership interests in traceable as-
sets within the pool. Assume that Wrongdoer steals silver teapots from
Owner-One and Owner-Two and exchanges one of them for a guitar,
and that furthermore Wrongdoer has two creditors: Creditor-One, with
a secured interest in the guitar, and Creditor-Two, a general creditor.
Tracing allows Owner-One to claim the guitar free from the claims of
either the secured or.the general creditor. Owner-Two's claim on the
guitar is subordinate to that of Creditor-One and on par with that of
Creditor-Two.69 In essence, tracing is a crude standard for segregating
those victims of misappropriations whose assets have augmented the
wrongdoer's wealth to the benefit of the wrongdoer's creditors, from
those victims of misappropriations whose assets have not augmented the
wrongdoer's wealth to the benefit of the wrongdoer's creditors.70 Be-
cause of its dependence on select transactional links rather than causal
links between the items misappropriated and the items in the wrong-
doer's hands a traditional tracing doctrine is simply not an acceptable
means of determining whether the wrongdoer's creditors are in fact ben-
efiting from the victim's loss. Perhaps a more sensible solution would be
to assume that a wrongdoer's creditors benefit from misappropriations
that occur within a set time of the satisfaction (total or partial) of the
creditor's claims.
Apart from the frequent inequity of discriminating between Own-
er-One and Owner-Two in the foregoing type of case, a serious question
also arises whether any priority of Owner-One over Creditor-One and
Creditor-Two is based on a historical anachronism or on a careful evalu-
ation of the comparative equities of all the claimants. Priority for Own-
er-One may be justified if one accepts the argument that Owner-One, as
an innocent victim, is more equitably entitled to the wrongdoing
69 Owner-Two may be slightly better off than Creditor-Two if Wrongdoer is in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, however. Owner-Two may be entitled to a decree of nondischargeability.
See In re Transport Clearings-Midwest, Inc., 16 Bankr. 890 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (tracing not a
condition of a decree of nondischargeability). But see In re Whitlock, 449 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D.
Mo. 1978) (tracing required for decree of nondischargeability). If so, the unsatisfied part of
Owner-Two's claim will survive the bankruptcy proceeding, but Creditor-Two's claim will
not.
70 See, e.g., idi; Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1913);In re J.M. Acheson Co.,
170 F. 427 (9th Cir. 1909); Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000 (D.N.D. 1978);
Lucianna v. Hip Sing Ass'n, 256 A.2d 898 (D.C. 1969). The debtor's bankruptcy brings the
same result. The Bankruptcy Code excludes from the bankrupt's estate property to "the ex-
tent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The Senate Report implies that the term "equitable interest"
includes claims based on constructive trust. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, 82,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5868. For an attack on the use of
equitable devices to undermine the policy of bankruptcy legislation, see McLaughlin, Amend-
ment of the Bankniptg/ Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 341, 389-90 (1927).
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debtor's remaining assets than are creditors, who intentionally assume
the risk of the debtor's insolvency when lending money. Perhaps credi-
tors can better protect their own interests and should not be awarded
recovery at the expense of a nonconsensual claimant. 71 Indeed, priority
for both Owner-One and Owner-Two may be justified by the foregoing
analysis. Moreover, this argument also would hold for all victims of
conversion, not just those pressing restitutionary claims. Yet, Owner-
Two's status in current law (which, in contrast to Owner-One's status, is
decided without reference to tracing) suggests that once tracing is elimi-
nated, neither Owner-One nor Owner-Two should be preferred to se-
cured creditors, and that they should take equally with general
creditors. In defense of this view, one could argue that Owner-One and
Owner-Two are not without their own means of protection. They can
take steps to protect their property (e.g., buy locks) and obtain property
insurance against misappropriations. 72 In any event, whether one ac-
cepts or rejects a general priority for involuntary claimants over secured
creditors, mere reference to the ancient constructs of equitable owner-
ship should not control the decision.
One can draw the same conclusion for the commingled-fund
branch of the tracing doctrine. In the commingling example of the pre-
vious section,73 the priority of secured and general creditors depends on
whether Owner-One or Owner-Two can trace into the fund of indistin-
guishable dollar bills. Owner-One can identify a specific fund contain-
ing converted money commingled with other funds and is assumed to
have benefited the wrongdoer's creditors, while Owner-Two, who can
state only that his money was converted by the wrongdoer, is conclu-
sively presumed not to have benefited the wrongdoer's creditors. Those
writers arguing for the so-called swollen assets theory in the 1930s
rightly contested the fairness of this test.74 Decisionmakers only accen-
tuate the folly when, under the pretext of measuring the creditors' un-
just benefit at Owner-One's expense, they use the traditional tracing
rules for commingled funds to calculate the amount of Owner-One's pri-
ority in the event of withdrawals from the fund. The fact that Owner-
One or even Owner-Two can trace, however, should carry little weight
compared to the arguments noted above for and against recognizing a
71 See D. DOBBS, SUra note 1, for a typical illustration of one who argues for a prefer-
ence for those who can trace and invokes, in essence, an argument for a preference for all
misappropriation victims whose assets augment the defendant's wealth:
[A] part of the profit made by the defendant from his fraud, would inure to
the benefit of the creditors, at the expense of the plaintiff. This would, in a
sense, unjustly enrich X's creditors, and thus a constructive trust is here again
a proper device to enforce restitution to the plaintiff.
Id at 244-45.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
73 See supra text accompanying note 66.
74 See supra note 33.
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priority for innocent, unintentional claimants over contractual creditors.
This controversy should be resolved largely by comparing the equities of
involuntary and voluntary claimants, and not resolved through simple
constructs of equitable ownership that favor some involuntary claimants
but not others.
The arguments against both exchange and commingled-fund
branches of tracing apply to section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.75 I will first treat the section's exchange tracing rule and then
turn to its rules on commingled proceeds. The section imposes, as a
general rule, a security interest in "identifiable" proceeds received by
the debtor from the disposition of collateral. 76 Courts have held, consis-
tent with the drafter's intentions, that the case law on tracing provides
the legal principles that define "identifiable" proceeds. Thus, the sec-
tion generally adopts exchange tracing-hook, line, and sinker.
Whether or not the defendant is subject to insolvency proceedings, a
secured creditor may trace proceeds of collateral-provided that the
proceeds are not commingled in cash funds and are subject to an appro-
priately perfected security interest-and thereby preserve his secured
status over other general creditors. The provision may favor secured
creditors via Article Nine remedies, and thus may disadvantage general
creditors, based on the fortuity of the debtor's acts in holding or dissipat-
ing the proceeds. The provision may also arbitrarily select between se-
cured creditors. For example, suppose Creditor-One has a security
interest in Debtor's old silver teapot and Creditor-Two has a security
interests in Debtor's new silver teapot. Debtor sells both teapots and
uses the proceeds of the teapot subject to Creditor-Two's interest to buy
wine, which he consumes. He places the proceeds of the teapot subject
to Creditor-One's interest in a drawer. If Debtor has no other assets,
Creditor-One receives all of Debtor's drawer-fund and Creditor-Two re-
ceives nothing. The result is unaltered even if Creditor-Two can prove
that Debtor did not care which teapot supplied the proceeds for the
wine, or that if Debtor had not possessed both teapots (so that one teapot
could provide funds for wine), he would not have stored the proceeds
from the sale of Creditor-One's teapot in the drawer.
One might argue for a distinction between tracing into property
misappropriated from completely involuntary victims and tracing into
the proceeds of items that are sold subject to a security interest. In the
latter case, the claimant has chosen to accept the defendant as a debtor;
in the former case, the claimant may be the victim of a conversion by a
stranger. Perhaps the disadvantage to the secured creditor who cannot
75 U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978).
76 Id § 9-306(2). This is a codification of pre-Code common law. See, e.g., In re Gibson
Prod., 543 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1976); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
28, § 45.9.
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trace, Creditor-Two in the above example, is justified because he should
have taken more care in choosing to lend or sell to Debtor, or in policing
his collateral, or in taking a security interest in both teapots. Of course,
the arguments favoring involuntary victims would also favor victims of
misappropriation by strangers over victims of misappropriation by trust-
ees and corporate fiduciaries who were chosen to manage the misappro-
priated property. Denial of a right to trace by such beneficiaries may be
justified by their failure to select or police the disobedient fiduciaries
with more care. The problem with such a distinction here, however, is
that the lack of care (or assumption of risk) argument extends in most
cases also to those who can trace, such as Creditor-One, and those who
cannot, such as Creditor-Two. Only in the unusual case in which Credi-
tor-One detects the misappropriation swiftly, and takes steps to locate
traceable property before the trail of exchanges becomes obscured (and
which otherwise would have become obscured absent his efforts), should
Creditor-One be better off than Creditor-Two, who in fact failed to take
similar steps to protect his interest. But the unusual case does not sup-
port a conclusive presumption that all Creditor-Ones, who can trace,
acted with due care while all Creditor-Twos, who cannot trace acted
irresponsibly.
It may be that exchange tracing in Article Nine survives because,
like most applications of tracing, it has deceptive intuitive appeal. At
first blush, the exchange rule appears necessary to prevent debtors from
frustrating secured creditors by selling the collateral to eliminate the se-
curity interest. The rule, however, offers only partial protection. Debt-
ors may still frustrate secured creditors by selling the collateral and
dissipating the proceeds to eliminate the security interest. This, of
course, reinforces the general argument set forth here that there is no a
priori reason for favoring creditors who can trace over those who cannot.
It may be that a better rule would create a new class of creditors-
secured creditors whose collateral has been wrongfully sold-and would
compare their positions with those of other secured and general credi-
tors. Should all such once-secured creditors receive some priority in
debtor's assets? Should we hold that secured creditors have assumed the
risk of all wrongful disposal of collateral, or should we say that they
have only assumed the risk of the nontraceability of proceeds from
wrongful disposal of the collateral (the current rule)? Here I defer to
those with expertise in Article Nine for a solution. Perhaps they should
promulgate a modified rule: If the proceeds were received within ten
days of insolvency, we assume that unsecured creditors were paid off or
otherwise benefited unjustly from the proceeds. This latter approach
seems more sensible than the current exchange rule, which favors select
secured creditors following proceeds. Indeed, section 9-306(4)(d) now
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uses the latter approach in the context of tracing into commingled cash
proceeds held by a debtor subject to insolvency proceedings.
For the debtor who commingles cash proceeds, the Code adopts,
with a revealing exception for insolvency proceedings, the old equity
courts' tracing rules for commingled funds.7 The problems noted
above on the effect of such rules therefore apply to section 9-306; certain
secured creditors are favored somewhat over others similarly situated
solely because of the transactional link between the cash proceeds and
an identifiable fund.
Secured creditors who can find a fund containing cash proceeds
commingled with the debtor's other funds can claim security in some or
all of the fund through the use of equitable tracing doctrines. In the
event of the debtor's insolvency and if there are no insolvency proceed-
ings (in which case section 9-306(4)(d) applies), a secured creditor who
can trace will do better than one who cannot. Again, tracing creates a
conclusive presumption that a secured creditor who can trace proceeds
into a commingled fund has identified proceeds that have augmented
the debtor's assets to the benefit of other creditors and a secured creditor
who cannot trace may not argue that the proceeds in which he has an
interest have augmented the debtor's assets. Even absent insolvency
tracing provides an advantage; the secured creditor who can trace his
security interest into a commingled fund thereby retains Article Nine
rights and remedies whereas a secured creditor who cannot trace is left
with a simple money claim. Of particular interest, however, is the ex-
ception contained in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) that reflects, in part, an ac-
ceptance in the context of insolvency proceedings of the arguments
against commingled-fund tracing outlined above.78 The subdivision ap-
plies in insolvency proceedings and permits a secured party with a per-
fected security interest in proceeds to claim cash and deposit accounts
containing commingled cash proceeds, but limits this interest to an
amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by
the debtor within ten days of the proceedings (less certain deductions).79
77 Section 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code incorporates the commingling
branch of tracing. If a debtor sells collateral and commingles the proceeds with other funds
or property, the creditor can trace into the fund to assert a security interest on the proceeds.
See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108
(1975); Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 25 Pa. D & C.2d 395, 1
U.C.C. REP. SE.v. 531 (Callaghan) (1958); U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 2 (1978); 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 28, § 45.9. Courts also hold that if the debtor makes withdrawals from the
commingled fund, the Rule of Jessel's Bag applies in a calculation of the amount of the
security interest that attaches to the fund. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974); supra note 66. The Uniform Commercial Code, in
§ 9-306(4) (d), however, fashions an important exception to traditional commingling fictions.
See infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
78 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. The language in U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)
(1978) referring to "the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor" has led to some
1983]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The drafters apparently decided that as a general matter secured
creditors who can trace proceeds into a specific fund subject to insol-
vency proceedings do not deserve priority over general creditors and se-
cured creditors who cannot trace. One could argue that the rejection of
tracing here reflects my position that tracing inaccurately distinguishes
between creditors following proceeds that have augmented the debtors'
estate and proceeds that have not augmented the estate. The evidence,
however, is to the contrary. Apparently, the rule was designed to penal-
ize creditors who could otherwise trace the proceeds in the hope that
creditors would better police their interests and prevent commingling.80
Thus interpreted, the section's use of commingled-fund tracing to aid
select creditors outside of insolvency proceedings (even though there is
insolvency in fact) is surprising.
The ten-day rule, however, which grants a limited priority to credi-
tors following cash proceeds into commingled funds, does seem to be
premised on a rejection of the core reasons behind tracing. The priority
does not depend on identifying a specific fund containing proceeds in
which the secured party had an interest.8 ' It is defended with a version
of the "swollen assets" theory that commentators otherwise reject.8 2
The bank accounts of a typical debtor who is subject to insolvency pro-
ceedings, the argument goes, contain mostly, if not exclusively, proceeds.
Even if a creditor's proceeds that the debtor receives within the ten-day
period are not in fact in the account, the other creditors cannot com-
plain; the proceeds most likely went to other creditors, diminishing their
claims on the debtor's assets.83 One may ask, however, why this ration-
confusion. Compare Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (statute
refers to proceeds from the collateral held for plaintiff) with In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1976) (statute refers to all receipts from any source). See
generally In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 Bankr. 236, 238 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (criticizing
Gibson and following Fitzpatrick). A second textual difficulty with the section concerns the
requirement that other "proceeds have been commingled with other funds." What if cash
proceeds that are received by the debtor within 10 days of the commencement of insolvency
proceedings, are dissipated before the date of filing but are not in fact commingled with other
funds while in the debtor's hands? Is the creditor with an interest in the proceeds excluded
from the benefit of § 9-306(4)(d)(ii)? Moreover, the language of § 547(b), (e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 may affect the operation of§ 9-306(4) in bankruptcy proceedings. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(b), (e) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act may render voidable the creditor's claim in
the proceeds as a preference. See Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law In Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
953, 962 n.27 (1981).
80 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, § 45.9, at 1338-39.
81 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, § 45.9, at 1340, 1344.
82 See supra note 33.
83 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 1014 (2d ed. 1980). ("[Other creditors] have no complaints, for they have
been made fat off the secured creditor's proceeds and are in the same postion as they would
have been had the money in the account been paid to them and the proceeds been put into
the account."). Professor Gilmore may favor a different rationale. In his treatise he seems to
justify the lack of any identification requirement on the ground that, given the limited nature
of a § 9-306 (4) (d) claim, the account will probably in fact contain more of the secured credi-
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ale does not apply to aid creditors other than those following cash pro-
ceeds. If a debtor receives non-cash proceeds (or cash proceeds that
have not been commingled) within ten days of an insolvency proceed-
ing, and the proceeds cannot be identified in the debtor's estate at the
time insolvency proceedings are instituted, should we assume that the
proceeds have gone to other creditors?
VII
TRACING AND THIRD-PARTY TRANSFEREES
The problems that tracing causes when creditors are involved are
mirrored in the cases involving innocent donees.8 4 Recall the original
tor's proceeds than the 10-day rule will allow him to claim. Set 2 G. GILMORE, 5zpra note 28,
§ 45.9, at 1339 ("[W]hat will be in the debtor's account on the date of insolvency... will
have come from deposits of proceeds [owing to his inventory finances] to a much greater
extent than the carefully limited amount of the claim.'). Apparently, the rationale for penal-
izing secured creditors who do not police their rights, see supra note 80, does not apply in this
case. Even so, the 10-day rule should be recognized as providing the reverse of the presump-
tion behind tracing doctrine. According to Gilmore, all creditors following cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days of insolvency are presumed deserving of preference
regardless of their ability to identify a specific fund containing those proceeds.
84 A necessary incident of Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877), see supra note 51, is the
creation of a special set of rules for innocent converters who became, after the case, subject to
tracing. These rules most commonly apply to innocent transferees of the wrongdoer who
receive traceable property. Of interest is why Newton stimulated the development of these
special rules.
When tracing applied only to trustee or fiduciary misappropyiations the courts did not
distinguish between innocent and knowledgeable conversions. The treatment of innocent
misappropriations by trustees has long been settled; equity courts order tracing relief against
a trustee whether or not his breach of trust is innocent or conscious. See, e.g., Loring v. Baker,
329 Mass. 63, 106 N.E.2d 434 (1952); see 1 G. PALMER, SUpra note 1, § 2.14(b); 3 A. ScoTT,
supra note 1, at § 201. For example, if a trustee, erroneously believing that he has a right to a
salary from the trust res, invests a portion of the res in stock for his own account, and through
extensive stock trading thereafter augments this account, the beneficiary receives an equitable
interest in all of the newly acquired stock in the account at the time ofjudgment. Thompson
v. Nesheim, 280 Minn. 407, 159 N.W.2d 910 (1968); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Clayton, 488 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades,
527 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). This remedy seems appropriate
because the trust res, if properly invested by the trustee, would have (or could have) produced
the same stock. In this sense, the trustee not only deprived the beneficiary of the misappropri-
ated property, but also of the trustee's skills in managing or investing the misappropriated
property. The actual product of his efforts, therefore, is a good measure of the loss. See supra
text accompanying note 53. A similar argument applies to innocent conversions by
fiduciaries. Most such conversions, even if innocent, involve the diversion of property from
the plaintiff's account that the fiduciary should have invested for the plaintiff's benefit. The
Restatement, therefore, favors full tracing relief against all fiduciaries. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 198 (1936). Scattered cases agree. See, e.g., Production Mach. Co. v. Howe,
327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951).
Innocent nonfiduciary conversions, supporting tracing relief only after Newton, are signif-
icantly dissimilar; an innocent converter does not typically withhold management or invest-
ment services from the plaintiff. Consider the following example. Donee innocently buys
stolen goods for $100 and exchanges the goods for stock, which he parlays through a series of
exchanges into stock worth $200. Should the owner of the goods be given an equitable inter-
est in the stock and be allowed to claim the stock in specie at a personal profit of $100? Most
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example in Section IV (Wrongdoer steals teapots from Owner-One and
Owner-Two, and exchanges one of the teapots for a guitar). If Wrong-
doer transfers the guitar to a gratuitous, innocent Donee, courts allow
Owner-One to charge Donee as a constructive trustee of the guitar.
Owner-One's equitable ownership interest attaches to the guitar, and he
can reclaim it even if Wrongdoer is solvent and available to be sued.
Owner-Two, on the other hand, has no claim against Donee unless
Owner-Two can prove that Wrongdoer's transfer defrauded creditors or
is voidable by a trustee in bankruptcy.8 5 Even if Owner-Two proves a
commentators favor limiting Owner to an equitable lien on the stock equal to the amount of
the misappropriation. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 243; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 1,
§ 2.14(9b); 5 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 509. The words of Professor Dobbs are typical:
"Where there is no intentional misdealing, the constructive trustee probably should not be
held liable for gains made in dealing with the property, except those that the plaintiff would
clearly have had for himself if he had retained the property all along." D. DOBBS, sufira note
1, at 243; accord RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 203 (1936). In addition, if the stock depre-
ciates in value below the value of the stolen goods (here $100), commentators favor granting
Donee the option of returning to Owner the stock in specie in full satisfaction of Owner's
claim. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 203 (1936). This theory of differentiating re-
covery on the basis of mental state may be explained by either of two rationales. First, a
removal of the profit motive adds a measure of deterrence against willful misconduct that is
unnecessary in cases of innocent misconduct. Second, a gain that is acquired through willful
misconduct is morally illegitimate, but a profit made through innocent misconduct is morally
legitimate.
The distinction between bona fide and mala fide misappropriations appears to have
originated in 1906 with Ames. See Ames, supra note 1, at 515-16. But see Dawson, supra note
8, at 614 (distinction first "appeared in 1937 when the Restatement was published"). No case
law on the subject, however, exists. The reporter's notes to the Restatement refer to Dixon v.
Caldwell, 15 Ohio St. 412 (1864) as supporting authority. The court in Dixon, however, effec-
tively denied any tracing relief to the victim of an innocent converter, and commentators who
argue that the case governs the type of tracing relief available against such converters stretch
the decision.
Those who support special tracing rules for innocent converters do not deny the victim
all constructive-trust relief, however. Rather, they would preserve for the victim constructive-
trust relief against any "direct product" of the misappropriated property. The Restatement
defines "direct product" as "that which is derived from the ownership or possession of the
property without the intervention of an independent transaction by the possessor." RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 157 comment b (1936). The concept thus distinguishes types
of income received by an innocent converter or gratuitous transferee from misappropriated
property and protects some income from full-blown tracing claims. For example, Owner,
induced by Wrongdoer's fraud, transfers Blackacre to Third Party, who is innocent and with-
out knowledge of the fraud. Owner reclaims the property and seeks to trace into the income
that Third Party acquired as a result of his use of the land. Third Party must account to
Owner for any rent that Third Party received from a lease existing before the transfer. More-
over, if the rent proceeds can be identified, Owner can trace into and impose a constructive
trust on the fund. On the other hand, if Third Party receives rent on a lease that he negoti-
ates after he acquires title, he must account to Owner for the actual rents paid, up to the
market rental value of the land. Owner bears the loss, if any, of Third Party's failure to use
the property profitably, and Third Party retains any premium rental that he obtains over
market rates. Thus, if the rental payment can be identified, Owner can trace into the rent
proceeds and, if the fund exceeds the market rental value, impose only an equitable lien equal
to the market rental value on the fund.
85 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 empowers the bankruptcy trustee to invalidate
certain pre-bankruptcy transfers. The property then becomes property of the estate and sub-
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voidable transfer in bankruptcy, however, he receives scant benefit, be-
cause he must divide the value of Donee's guitar with other creditors.
Although situations in which Wrongdoer is solvent will rarely arise,
Owner-One's ability to sue either Wrongdoer or Donee demonstrates
the current strength of the old equitable-ownership notions. Indeed, if
the guitar has appreciated in Donee's hands, Owner-One is encouraged
to sue Donee rather than Wrongdoer in order to obtain the gain from
that appreciation.8 6 If Owner-One does elect to sue only the innocent
third party, the solvent wrongdoer escapes liability and is subject only to
the frustration of having his gift to Donee voided.
If Wrongdoer is insolvent or cannot be found, the merits of a claim
by Owner-One or Owner-Two against Donee are more weighty. Donee
holds a gift from Wrongdoer and, unless he has changed his position in
reliance on his continuing ownership of the gift,87 Donee gains at no
cost, while Owner-One and Owner-Two suffer injury. If Donee can re-
store Owner-One's and Owner-Two's losses, all three parties are restored
to their position before Wrongdoer's acts. Identifying the class of third
parties susceptible to suit, unfortunately, is a difficult task. Should all
individuals receiving gifts from Wrongdoer after the time of his thefts be
liable to the victims? The tracing rules provide a certain, but arbitrary
method of selection: If Owner-One can trace property into the hands of
a donee, he may sue that donee.
Thus, the rule favors both select claimants who can trace and select
third parties who hold untraceable gifts from Wrongdoer. For example,
assume that Wrongdoer, when he stole the silver teapots from Owner-
One and Owner-Two, had $100 in his pocket. Thereafter, Wrongdoer
exchanges Owner-One's teapot for a pink guitar, which he gives to Do-
nee-One, and exchanges the $100 in his pocket for a green guitar, which
he gives to Donee-Two. Owner-Two's teapot is exchanged for wine,
which Wrongdoer consumes. Owner-One may claim the pink guitar
from Donee-One. Yet Owner-Two cannot sue Donee-Two unless the
transfer of the green guitar was a fraud on Wrongdoer's creditors. The
result is unaltered if Donee-One, attempting to convince the court that
Donee-Two should share equally liability for Wrongdoer's act, proves
that Wrongdoer distributed the guitars to Donee-One and Donee-Two
ject to the creditors' claims. Voidable transfers include fraudulent conveyances and prefer-
ences. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 547(b), 548 (Supp. IV 1980). If the wrongdoer is a
corporation, state receivership law may also apply. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Keystone Realty
Holding Co., 333 Pa. 9, 3 A.2d 426 (1939). But see In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., 239
F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956) (federal bankruptcy law suspends sections of Wisconsin insolvency
statutes providing for commencement of involuntary proceedings against insolvent), cert. de-
nied, 353 U.S. 985 (1957).
86 Donee, of course, has no claim against Wrongdoer for the loss of the gift.
87 See generally RESTrATEM ENT OF REsTrrUTION § 142 (1936); Dawson, supra note 8, at
567-76.
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by lot. Instead, courts assume that Donee-One has benefited unjustly as
a result of the first theft but that Donee-Two has not so benefited as a
result of the second theft. Moreover, Owner-Two has no claim against
either Donee-One or Donee-Two.
A better rule would equalize the positions of Owner-One and Own-
er-Two as well as those of Donee-One and Donee-Two. The following is
an example: All gratuitous donees of Wrongdoer that receive their gifts
ninety days before or anytime after Wrongdoer's insolvency are jointly
and severally liable (with a right of contribution from each other) for
the amount of Wrongdoer's wrongful appropriations to the extent of the
gift to each.88 A second, and perhaps more sensible, alternative would
totally eliminate the effect of the tracing fictions and defer to fraudu-
lent-conveyance doctrine or bankruptcy law wherever claims against
bona fide donees of the wrongdoer are in issue; neither Owner-One nor
Owner-Two could prevail in his claim against either Donee-One or Do-
nee-Two, unless Wrongdoer's gift was a fraudulent conveyance or a
transfer voidable by a trustee in bankruptcy.89
CONCLUSION
Tracing is not an accurate measure of the defendant's actual bene-
fit from a misappropriation unless he is unable to purchase the traced
property with his own funds or is an errant fiduciary who misappropri-
ates assets over which he has management responsibility. Even in cases
in which tracing can be justified as a measure of unjustly held benefit,
however, the doctrine discriminates arbitrarily between claimants.
Moreover, tracing often does not yield sensible results if the outcome
affects other creditors of the defendant, the defendant's right to keep
exempt property, or third-party donees. In sum, tracing doctrine can
serve only as a rough rule of thumb for divesting a defendant of an
unjustly acquired gain in a very narrow range of cases-so narrow that
88 f !1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980) (trustee may avoid certain transfer of
debtor's property made within 90 days before filing of bankruptcy petition). The rule would
require Owner-One and Owner-Two to sue Wrongdoer for their loss unless insolvency exists
or is imminent. Once insolvency becomes an issue, all gratuitous donees who received gifts 90
days before wrongdoer's insolvency would be presumed to have profited from Wrongdoer's
thefts.
89 A similar argument applies to question tracing's effect on the exempt property stat-
utes. Under current tracing doctrine if, for example, Wrongdoer, after stealing Owner-One's
and Owner-Two's teapots, had exchanged Owner-One's teapot for an automobile that home-
stead exemption law protects, Owner-One could claim the automobile. See supra note 44.
Owner-One is construed to have equitable title to the automobile, and Wrongdoer cannot
claim an exemption for items to which he does not have full title. Owner-Two obtains, on the
other hand, an unsatisfiable personal judgment against Wrongdoer (assuming he has no assets
other than the automobile), because the statute restricts the execution of simple judgment
debts. Courts assume, therefore, that the Wrongdoer's exempt assets are the product of Own-
er-One's misappropriation and not the product of Owner-Two's misappropriation.
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one wonders whether the doctrine is worth the effort to apply it
correctly.
Despite the infrequency of tracing problems in the case law, the
doctrine deserves continued and critical attention. The suggestion that
courts and lawyers will let tracing fade through disuse, either because
they are sensitive to the existing criticisms of tracing or are ignorant of
the power of this classic remedy, underestimates the resiliency of the
doctrine; tracing has found its way, for example, into Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, a critical examination of trac-
ing reveals problems with the concept of unjust enrichment generally,
and thus questions indirectly the validity of other restitutionary
doctrines.
Quasi-contract,90 for example, has problems analogous to those of
tracing. Quasi-contract, like tracing, often miscalculates the defendant's
benefit. Consider Wrongdoer, who using unique personal skills and
much personal time, discovers an attractive opportunity: in a nearby
state he can sell a type of silver teapot for $200 that is marketed locally
for $100. Wrongdoer has well over $100 in the bank in an interest-
bearing account, but he instead chooses to steal Owner's teapot to make
the sale. The proceeds of the profit on the sale are dissipated; no tracing
is possible. Owner secures a money judgment for $200 through quasi-
contract, even though Wrongdoer's real gain from the conversion is
more likely the amount of the interest that he was able to collect by not
having to use his own money to acquire a suitable teapot for the sale.
Moreover, quasi-contract shares with tracing the problems of credit and
apportionment. Owner's recovery of the $200 is automatic. The gain
embodied in the sale proceeds is conclusively presumed to be attributa-
ble to the property itself and not to the skill and efforts of Wrongdoer;
Wrongdoer may not receive a credit for expenses incurred in obtaining
the sale proceeds. Thus, if Wrongdoer has personally contributed to the
profitability of a successful sale-for example, incurring advertising ex-
penses-he obtains no credit for those contributions. As in tracing, this
rule cannot be justified solely on the ground of disgorging a gain, for it
penalizes Wrongdoer to the extent of his personal contribution, as well
as taking his profit. Is the penalty necessary because the courts cannot
administratively investigate the facts of each case, or is the penalty in-
herently justifiable? As with tracing, a simple reference to the principle
90 As far back as 1705, courts have held that the victim of conversion could recover the
proceeds from the sale of the converted property by the wrongdoer. The early cases justified
the result through a fiction that the plaintiff could "suppose the sale made by his consent, and
bring an action for the money [so obtained], as money received to his use." Lamine v. Dor-
rell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216, 1216, 92 Eng. Rep. 303, 303 (1705). Modem cases base recovery of
the sale proceeds on the principle of unjust enrichment: Sale proceeds exceeding the value of
the converted property at the time of the conversion represent a gain to the defendant and
should be disgorged. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 comment f (1936).
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of unjust enrichment provides no answers. 9 1
I have in this article challenged the premises of centuries of legal
thought on restitutionary remedies. Others may not agree with my con-
clusions. Even so, if I have led them to rethink these premises, I will
have in significant measure accomplished my objectives.
91 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrTUTION §§ 151, 154 (1936).
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